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SIX DECADES OF ORGAN DONATION
AND THE CHALLENGES THAT SHIFTING
THE UNITED STATES TO A MARKET
SYSTEM WOULD CREATE AROUND THE
WORLD
ALEXANDER M. CAPRON*
I
INTRODUCTION
1

Since the beginning of human kidney transplantation six decades ago, and
especially since the first heart transplant and the creation of deceased-donation
programs forty-five years ago in the United States, the Western model for organ
donation has been one of unpaid giving. Such a donation typically occurs for
what are termed “altruistic” reasons, meaning that the organ donor is not acting
for material gain. As transplantation has spread around the world, the model of
unpaid donation has not uniformly followed it into settings that are socially,
medically, and legally very different. Nonetheless, over the past twenty-five
years, the principled stand of intergovernmental and professional organizations
has come much closer to making noncommercial organ donation truly the
universal ethical norm. But its hold remains tenuous, and hence the gains made
in protecting vulnerable, desperate organ sellers against exploitation could be
easily lost.
In this article I examine the reasons why unpaid organ donation came to be
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1. Physician–investigators tried to use transplantation of human and animal organs for patients
with acute and chronic kidney failure more than one-hundred years ago but were thwarted by the
immune-rejection process that they recognized but did not understand. Only in the 1940s did physicians
begin to have several small successes when the kidneys of patients with acute disease were able to
become operative again. For example, in 1950, in what is sometimes termed the first successful
transplant, a kidney from a deceased patient was transplanted into Ruth Tucker in Chicago. It was wellenough matched to work for five months before being rejected; this “bridge” allowed one of her own
kidneys to resume functioning, and she lived another five years. DAVID PETECHUK, ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION 10–11 (2006).
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the prevailing global standard—albeit an incompletely achieved one—with local
differences and complications. I then explore the costs and benefits that might
arise from moving to a system in which the transfer of organs is induced by
material rewards that aim to increase the supply of organs for transplantation,
2
as urged by several participants in this symposium. Finally, I ask whether an
ethical reckoning of the costs and benefits of moving to such a system in the
United States—usually described as some sort of “market in organs”—ought to
include the effects that such a change would have on the ongoing efforts in
other countries to establish or extend prohibitions on organ sales; I conclude
with an affirmative answer to that question.
II
THE FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION AS A SOCIAL
PRACTICE
Kidney transplantation was born amid controversy because it involved—and
continues to involve—a surgeon carrying out a very un-Hippocratic act that
potentially endangers a person’s life and leaves him or her somewhat less
healthy than had the surgeon not acted. When the first successful “permanent”
human-to-human kidney transplant was performed in 1954 at Peter Bent
Brigham Hospital in Boston between the Herrick twins, the surgeons were
willing to wheel the donor twin, Ronald, into an operating room and remove
one of his healthy organs because doing so enabled Ronald to become a donor
and attempt to rescue his ailing brother, a courageous feat that Ronald could
3
not have accomplished without the doctors’ involvement. In the end, the
success of that heroic act quieted the criticism voiced within the medical
community that physicians should not depart from the historic tenet of primum
non nocere—above all, do no harm—even for a laudable goal.
During the following decades, such brave and loving acts were repeated as
gifts, first by other identical twins and then by a wider range of donors, such as
siblings and other close blood relatives, as physicians gained greater knowledge
about tissue typing for transplant antigens and then as immunosuppressive
4
drugs overcame the need for a close tissue match to avoid organ rejection. A
2. See, e.g., T. Randolph Beard & Jim Leitzel, Designing a Compensated–Kidney Donation
System, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2014, at 253; Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, & Eric A.
Posner, Altruism Exchanges and the Kidney Shortage, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2014, at 289;
Kimberly D. Krawiec & Michael A. Rees, Reverse Transplant Tourism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
no. 3, 2014, at 145; Sally Satel, Joshua C. Morrison, & Rick K. Jones, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no.
3, 2014, at 217.
3. Brian Marquad, Pioneer Organ Donor Dies, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 20, 2010, at B1. The Herrick
brothers also saw the operation in this way. On the night before the surgery, Ronald got a note from a
very sick Richard, who was in another room at the Peter Bent Brigham Hospital in Boston, telling
Ronald to leave the hospital and go home. Ronald sent a note back saying, “I’m here, and I’m going to
stay, and that’s it.” Richard lived for eight years after receiving a kidney from his brother who lived
fifty-six years after giving it. Id.
4. JAY KATZ & ALEXANDER MORGAN CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASES: WHO DECIDES
WHAT? 43–46 (1975).
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well-managed kidney donation with good medical follow-up creates only a very
small chance of serious harm to the donor, but physicians remained
uncomfortable with the procedure, especially when the donor was unrelated to
the recipient. One 1971 survey of transplant doctors found that half of the fiftyfour respondents disapproved of using unrelated living kidney donors and that
only twenty percent had used such donors themselves in transplants they had
5
performed. Part of this came about because the physicians believed that the
results for recipients using a living donor are no better than for those using a
cadaver donor, which built on the long-standing principled concern over
departing from the ethics of the profession by risking a healthy person’s well
being. But the study also revealed “much evidence of distrust and suspicion
6
towards the donors and definite repugnance concerning their use.” The
physicians believed they were very likely to cause harm to the donor’s
personality and felt like accomplices of a person wishing to risk his or her own
7
life. In short, the core objection seems to have been the psychological verdict
that unrelated donors are “crazy.”
Although the road to success initially depended on well-matched living
donors, surgeons soon turned to cadaver sources, which could be utilized with
the permission of next of kin without putting a living donor at risk. The shift to
cadaver donors was driven not only by physicians’ discomfort with unrelated
living kidney donors but also by the availability of deceased donors, who were
needed for transplanting a whole liver or a heart, where the first successes came
in 1963 and 1967, respectively. Cadavers became the preferred source for all
organs once brain-based determinations of death in ventilator-supported
patients came to be widely used beginning in the late 1960s.
The promulgation of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) by the
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) in
1968 facilitated the growing reliance on deceased persons as organ sources by
authorizing people to execute simple “donor cards” to allow use of their bodies
(or particular parts thereof) after death for transplantation, as well as for
8
research or teaching. When a deceased person has failed to express his or her
wishes regarding donation, the UAGA permits specified next of kin to make
9
the decision to donate. The statute—which quickly became the most widely
and uniformly adopted model law in the history of the NCCUSL—continued to
treat organs as “gifts” but broadened the scope of beneficiaries of this

5. H. Harrison Sadler et al., The Living, Genetically Unrelated, Kidney Donor, 3 SEMINARS IN
PSYCHIATRY 86, 95 (1971).
6. Id. at 96. On the practical side, the respondents worried that living donors would return to
harass the recipient or the hospital.
7. Carl H. Fellner & Shalom H. Schwartz, Altruism In Disrespute, 11 NEW ENG. J. MED. 582, 582
(1971) (quoting Dr. Jean Hamburger as stating that “the major problem is the question as to how far
the physician has the right to become the accomplice of a person who wishes to take a risk with his or
her own life”).
8. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4, 8A U.L.A. 15 (1968).
9. Id. § 2.
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generosity from identified individuals to the community at large, as represented
by the hospital where the donor died, which serves as the trustee of the donated
human remains. The UAGA not only made obtaining organs from deceased
persons much simpler but also served to underline society’s commitment to
organ donation as an appropriate manifestation of solidarity as well as
individual generosity.
Two subsequent manifestations of that commitment did at least as much to
increase the rate of organ transplantation. First, the Social Security
Amendments passed by Congress in October 1972 extended Medicare coverage
to people with end-stage renal disease (ESRD) and gave federal administrators
the authority to contract with regional “coordinating councils” of medical,
nursing, and social-work specialists in renal care, hospitals, other facilities, and
10
organ-donation organizations to facilitate care. The guarantee of Medicare
funding prompted the creation of adequate hemodialysis capacity, so all kidney
patients in need could access treatment. This was important in maintaining
kidney patients while they waited for a suitable donor to be identified and in
11
increasing the pool of potential transplant recipients.
The second instance of legislative support for the system of treating organs
as unpaid gifts came in response to a Virginia physician’s 1983 proposal to
overcome the shortage of kidneys by bringing people from abroad to serve as
paid kidney donors. Dr. H. Barry Jacobs, whose license had been revoked for
Medicare fraud, proposed to establish an organization that would be known as

10. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (1972) (codified as
amended is scattered sections of the U.S. Code). Under the 1976 regulations, thirty-two ESRD
networks were established; this number was reduced to eighteen in 1987.
11. In 1972, out of the estimated 55,000 persons with chronic kidney disease (CKD), of whom
20,000–25,000 were candidates for dialysis, 10,000 were receiving hemodialysis and more than 2,000
patients received kidney transplants. Richard A. Rettig, Origins of the Medicare Kidney Disease
Entitlement: The Social Security Amendments of 1972, in BIOMEDICAL POLITICS 176, 182, & 196 (Kathi
E. Hanna, ed., 1991). In 2012, 17,287 kidney transplants were performed in the United States. Health
Resources and Services Administration, UNITED STATES ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION OPTN/SRTR
2010
ANNUAL DATA REPORT 9
(2014),
http://srtr.transplant.hrsa.gov/annual_reports/
2012/pdf/00_intro_13.pdf. The incidence of end-stage renal disease (ESRD), which is the diagnosis that
qualifies people for Medicare coverage, more than quadrupled between 1980 and 2001, but then leveled
off at about 350 persons per million. National Kidney and Urologic Diseases Information
Clearinghouse, Kidney Disease Statistics for the United States 3 (2012), http://kidney.niddk.nih.gov.
Since dialysis and transplantation prolong the lives of ESRD patients (producing five-year surivval
rates of 35.8% and 85.%, respectively, as of 2009), id. at 10, the prevalence of ESRD increase from 290
to 1738 per million between 1980 and 2009. Id. at 4. As of the end of 2011, 185,626 ESRD patients were
living with a kidney transplant, while 430,273 were on dialysis, an ESRD prevalence of 1901 cases per
million population, 52% larger than in 2000. The marked increase in ESRD is also attributable to the
rise in the number of older Americans, among whom the prevalence of ESRD per million persons
reached 6307 for those age 65–74 and 6007 for those age 75 years and older in 2011. United States
Renal Data System, Annual Data Report 2013, Volume Two: Atlas of End-Stage Renal Disease in the
United States, at 223 (2014). That increase in turn reflects the rapid increase in the occurrence and
detection of CKD among older persons in recent years; for example, between 2000 and 2008, the
incidence of recognized CKD in persons aged 65 and older more than doubled, to 4.4%, and the 2001–
2008 National Health and Nutrition Examination Study revealed that 26% of people aged 60 or more
have Stage 3 CKD. Kidney Disease Statistics, supra, at 2.
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the International Kidney Exchange, Ltd. He argued that, for a large number of
people in Central and South America, even a relatively modest payment would
13
be sufficient inducement to part with a kidney. The response from Congress
14
was immediate and bipartisan. The National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA)
made it unlawful “for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise
transfer any human organ for valuable consideration” (excluding the costs of
15
procurement). Rather than by providing payment to donors, it addressed the
organ shortage by authorizing a public–private partnership in the form of the
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) to stimulate the
process of obtaining organs and to make their distribution as fair, transparent,
16
and efficient as possible.
The principle that organs for transplantation are gifts to the community
rather than market commodities influenced other countries as they established
17
their own programs and laws. The U.S. approach was fully accepted in
Western Europe, where it had been practiced from the beginning of kidney
transplantation; policies in Europe were grounded in the human-rights
principles that underlie bioethics legislation and in the need for cooperation
18
across national borders. Elsewhere, however, in countries where the rule of
12. Walter Sullivan, Buying of Kidneys of Poor Attacked, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1983, at 9.
13. National Organ Transplant Act: Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health & the
Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 98th Cong. 224 (1983) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R.
4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health & Env’t] (statement of Dr. H. Barry Jacobs).
14. Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 274–274e (2006
& Supp. IV 2011)).
15. Id. § 274e.
16. Id. § 274. The United Network for Organ Sharing of Richmond, Virginia, was awarded the
initial OPTN contract on September 30, 1986; its contract has been periodically renewed. Its policysetting is subject to public review and coordinated with the federal government.
First a UNOS committee develops policy proposals. Then the committee writes and
disseminates an initial brief explaining the need for the proposed policy changes. Next the
committee asks for public comments on the policy proposals. The committee then responds to
the comments by the public and submits a final proposal to the Board of Directors. The Board
votes on the proposal, and if the Board approves the proposal it becomes UNOS/OPTN rule.
The Board can also submit an approved proposal to the Secretary of HHS, and if the
Secretary approves the policy it is incorporated into official regulation.
Sam Crow & Eric Cohen, Organ Donation Policy [Sec. I.d.] (President’s Council on Bioethics, Staff
Discussion Paper: Organ Transplantation Policies and Policy Reforms (Sept. 2006)),
https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcbe/background/organ_donation.html#part1.
17. For example, in the United Kingdom, see the Human Organ Transplants Act, 1989, c. 31, §1
(Eng.).
18. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being
with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine, April 4, 1997, E.T.S. 164 [hereinafter Oviedo Convention]. Article 19(1) obligates
signatories to ensure that under their country’s laws organs and tissues will be removed from a living
person for transplantation purposes “solely for the therapeutic benefit of the recipient and where there
is no suitable organ or tissue available from a deceased person and no other alternative therapeutic
method of comparable effectiveness.” Id. at art. 19(1). Article 21 obligates signatories to forbid
payments for organs under their national laws (“The human body and its parts shall not, as such, give
rise to financial gain.”) Id. at art. 21. This provision is further elaborated by an additional protocol
passed on January 24, 2004, under which countries must also outlaw advertising to offer or solicit
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law was less strong, where human rights were not enforced, where economic
inequality was more pronounced, and where health-care systems were not set
up to support deceased donation, transplantation depended on living donors,
particularly poor and marginalized persons, whose agreement to “donate”
19
could be bought or coerced. By the mid-1980s, reports began emerging,
principally from Asia and Latin America, of surgeons providng wealthy patients
(both indigenous and foreign) with transplanted kidneys that had been
20
purchased from impoverished people. In 1987, at the urging of several member
states, the Fortieth World Health Assembly took note of the problem and
requested the Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) “to
study, in collaboration with other organizations concerned, the possibility of
21
developing appropriate guiding principles for human organ transplants.” The
organs or tissues in exchanging for money “or comparable advantage,” but may permit payments to
cover a donor’s lost wages and medical expenses or the costs of preparing, transporting, and
transplating an organ. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
Concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin, art. 21, Jan. 24, 2002, E.T.S. 186.
Article 22 requires that national laws prohibit “organ and tissue trafficking,” the first mention of this
activity in an international legal document. Id. at art. 22. The Oviedo Convention had sufficient
signatories to come into effect on January 12, 1999; at last count, it has been ratified by twenty-nine
EUR.,
countries.
Chart
of
Signatories
to
the
Oviedo
Convention,
COUNCIL
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=164&CM=8&DF=28/03/2013&CL=EN
G (last visited March 28, 2013). Its additional protocol on transplantation has been ratified by 12
countries. Chart of Signatories to the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin, COUNCIL EUR.,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=186&CM=8&DF=28/03/2013&CL=EN
G (last visited March 28, 2013). On July 9, 2014, the Committee of Ministers adopted the Council of
Europe Convention against Trafficking in Human Organs, which will be opened for signatures on
March
25,
2015,
in
Santiago
de
Compostela,
Spain.
http://www.conventions.coe.int/?pg=/Treaty/projects/Projets_en.asp (last visited Oct. 18, 2014). The
new convention complements existing law on human trafficking by not requiring proof of coercion or
exploitation of vulnerability of organ sellers and by encompassing acts that support commercial organ
donation, including knowing use of a vended organ by translant physicians. See Marta López-Fraga et
al., A Needed Convention Against Trafficking in Human Organs, 383 LANCET 2187 (2014).
19. See COUNCIL OF EUR. & UNITED NATIONS, TRAFFICKING IN ORGANS, TISSUES AND CELLS
AND TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE REMOVAL OF ORGANS 18 (2009);
Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Keeping an Eye on the Global Traffic in Human Organs, 361 LANCET 1645,
1647 (2011) [hereinafter Scheper-Hughes, Keeping an Eye]; Larry Rohter, Tracking the Sale of a Kidney
On a Path of Poverty and Hope, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2004, at N1; see also Henri Decoeur, A Special
Tribunal to Prosecute Individuals Involved in Organ Trafficking in Kosovo: Born to Fail?, CAMBRIDGE
J. INT’L & COMP. L. (Apr. 5, 2014), http://cjicl.org.uk/2014/04/05/special-tribunal-prosecute-individualsinvolved-organ-trafficking-kosovo-born-fail/.
20. Nancy Scheper-Hughes, The Global Traffic in Human Organs, 41 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
191, 207–08 (2000) [hereinafter Scheper-Hughes, The Global Traffic in Human Organs].
21. W.H.A. Res. 40.13, W.H.O. Doc. A40/1987/REC/1 (May 13, 1987). Following the adoption of
a second resolution entitled Preventing the Purchase and Sale of Human Organs, W.H.A. Res. 42.5,
W.H.O. Doc. A42/1989/REC/1 (May 15, 1989), the WHO secretariat began several initiatives, which
included establishing an internal working group and convening an informal, multidisciplinary
international consultation of experts in organ transplantation, medical ethics, and health policy and law,
and representatives of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, in Geneva in May 1990,
which found that developing the guiding principles called for in WHA Resolution 40.13 was feasible
and reviewed an initial draft of a set of such principles, which were then amended and widely
distributed to other experts on medical, legal, ethical, cultural, religious, and health-policy aspects of
organ transplantation as well as to all six WHO regional offices for their comments. A second draft was
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Guiding Principles on Human Organ Transplantation (Guiding Principles),
which were approved by the Forty-Fourth World Health Assembly in May
1991, established a preference for deceased over living donors and, among
living donors, a preference for related over unrelated donors, and proclaimed
globally the model of voluntary, unpaid donation of organs from living and
deceased donors that had provided the ethical foundation for transplantation in
22
the United States for the previous four decades.
A dozen years later, WHO commenced a process of reexamining the
Guiding Principles. Several factors lay behind the request from member states
for the review: first, the increasing portion of kidney transplants involving living
donors—both related and unrelated—in many nations; second, the growth in
“transplant tourism” in developing countries, spurred by Internet advertising
geared towards reaching patients in wealthier countries who need kidney
transplants; third, the need to consider the relationship between the growing
commerce in processed tissues and cells and the principle of noncommercialism
at the heart of the Guiding Principles, which had been framed in the context of
23
solid organs; and fourth, criticisms by certain Western philosophers and
transplant physicians who favored allowing markets as a means of increasing
24
the availability of organs for transplantation. The revised WHO Guiding
Principles, which emerged from an extensive, seven-year process of consultation
with governments and experts globally, were approved by the Sixty-Third
25
World Health Assembly in May 2010. The new version strengthens the
anticommercialism position of the 1991 document and adds two further
provisions calling for national transplant programs to provide greater
transparency in their activities and heightened attention to the safety and
26
traceability of organs, especially when sent to other countries.

reviewed at a smaller consultation in Geneva in October 1990. Following that meeting the secretariat
prepared further drafts and a final version was submitted to the WHO governing bodies in 1991. World
Health Organization, Human Organ Transplantation: A Report on Developments Under the Auspices of
WHO (1987–1991) 42 INT’L DIGEST HEALTH LEGIS. 389 (1991).
22. W.H.A. Res. 44.25, W.H.O. Doc. A44/1991/REC/1 (May 13, 1991). The Guiding Principles
also set forth other protections, such as avoiding conflicts of interest for the physician who declares a
potential donor dead.
23. See World Health Org. Secretariat, Human Organ and Tissue Transplantation: Rep. by the
Secretariat, W.H.O. Doc. A62/15 (Mar. 26, 2009).
24. See, e.g., Charles A. Erin & John Harris, An Ethical Market in Human Organs, 29 J. MED.
ETHICS 137 (2003); J. Radcliffe Richards, Commentary. An Ethical Market in Human Organs, 29 J.
MED. ETHICS 139 (2003) [hereinafter Richards, Commentary].
25. W.H.A. Res. 63.22, W.H.O. Doc. A63/2010/REC/1 (May 21, 2010).
26. World Health Org. Secretariat, supra note 23, at 2–3. (Guiding Principle 5 prohibits the sale of
cells, tissues and organs, World Health Org. Secretariat, supra note 23, at 9, while the added Guiding
Principles 10 and 11 call for safety and traceability, and transparency, respectively, World Health Org.
Secretariat, supra note 23, at 12–13.)
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III
MAKING (PRECARIOUS) PROGRESS
A. Global Patterns in Organ Transplantation
Organ transplantation is now undertaken at medical facilities in more than
100 countries around the world, but the rate at which it occurs varies
enormously, as do the circumstances under which it is carried out. In 2011,
112,631 transplants were reported globally, an increase of 11.6% since 2008,
when the Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism
27
(Declaration of Istanbul) was adopted. With more than 5.5% annual growth
during this period, deceased donation—which WHO Guiding Principle 3 states
“should be developed to its maximum therapeutic potential” in preference to
the use of living donors (who “should be genetically, legally or emotionally
related to their recipients” to avoid commercial relationships)—grew even more
rapidly, with a cumulative increase of approximately 17.4% between 2008 and
28
2011. Overall, about 37,233 kidney transplants involved deceased donors in
2008; this number increased to just over 43,714 in 2011, and the increase in
several regions was even more impressive: nearly 50% in WHO’s Eastern
29
Mediterranean Region and almost 33% in its Western Pacific Region.
27. Steering Committee of the Istanbul Summit, Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism and
Commercialism: The Declaration of Istanbul, 372 LANCET 5 (2008). The full declaration was printed in
several medical journals. See, e.g., Participants in the International Summit on Transplant Tourism and
Organ Trafficking convened by the Transplantation Society and the International Society of
Nephrology in Istanbul, Turkey, 30 April to 2 May 2008, The Declaration of Istanbul on Organ
Trafficking and Transplant Tourism, 23 NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS TRANSPLANTATION 3375 (2008).
28. Compare GLOBAL OBSERVATORY ON DONATION & TRANSPLANTATION, ACTIVITY DATA
2008, at 3 (2008) [hereinafter GLOBAL OBSERVATORY ON DONATION & TRANSPLANTATION, 2008
available
at
http://issuu.com/o-n-t/docs/2008?e=4461754/2882493,
with
GLOBAL
DATA],
OBSERVATORY ON DONATION & TRANSPLANTATION, ORGAN DONATION AND TRANSPLANTATION
ACTIVITIES 2011, at 5 (2011) [hereinafter GLOBAL OBSERVATORY ON DONATION &
TRANSPLANTATION,
2011
DATA],
available
at
http://issuu.com/o-nt/docs/2011adg?e=4461754/3988136.pdf. These figures were calculated by applying the percentage of
deceased donations in each of WHO’s regions to the total number of donations in those regions for
both of the years at issue, and then by comparing the yearly figures. According to the Global
Observatory on Donation and Transplantation, the percentage of organs from deceased donors grew in
all regions during those years, and the absolute numbers increased in all regions except Sub-Saharan
Africa. Id. (indicating, through the figures necessary for the calculation just mentioned, that SubSaharan deceased donations fell in absolute terms from 160 to about 154). The lack of an increase in
Sub-Saharan Africa is probably explained by the closing of a program in South Africa that transplanted
vended kidneys from living donors into foreign patients. Michael Smith, Organ Gangs Force Poor to
(Nov.
11,
2011,
6:00
PM),
Sell
Kidneys
for
Desperate
Israelis,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-01/organ-gangs-force-poor-to-sell-kidneys-for-desperateisraelis.html.
29. Compare GLOBAL OBSERVATORY ON DONATION & TRANSPLANTATION, 2008 DATA, supra
note 28, with GLOBAL OBSERVATORY ON DONATION & TRANSPLANTATION, 2011 DATA, supra note
28. The transplant activities included in the 2011 report actually reflect 2011 data from 94 countries
along with 2010 data from four countries (including China), 2009 data for two countries, and 2008 data
for three countries. Id. at 3, 18. The Global Observatory on Donation and Transplantation describes
these numbers as “provisional estimates” that are subject to revision. Id. at 18. In particular, the data
from China, India and South Africa are “best estimates from official sources” because these countries
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Despite efforts by WHO and professional bodies to increase the technical
capacity of medical facilities around the world to carry out advanced surgical
procedures including transplantation and to develop the medical and
governmental infrastructure to support organ donation from deceased persons,
living donation is the norm in many parts of the world, with the result that the
overall rate and pattern of transplantation vary widely. WHO reports data on
the number of transplants broken down by organ and by its six regional
30
groupings of countries.
Table: Kidney and Liver Transplants in 2009
WHO Region

Kidney Transplants

Liver Transplants

Sub-Saharan Africa
Americas
Eastern Mediterranean
Europe
Southeast Asia
Western Pacific

463 (0.56)
27728 (29.96)
5582 (9.4)
21713 (24.2)
5801 (3.25)
10131 (5.64)

42 (0.05)
8741 (9.4)
415 (0.70)
7577 (8.45)
508 (0.28)
3744 (2.08)

Legend: Number (rate per million population (pmp))
Note: Totals include both living and deceased donors. Bold indicates regions with
highest and lowest population rates.
Source: GLOBAL OBSERVATORY ON DONATION & TRANSPLANTATION, ORGAN
DONATION AND TRANSPLANTATION ACTIVITIES 2009, at 4 (2009), available at
http://issuu.com/o-n-t/docs/2009?e=4461754/2879005.

The data in the table show the absolute numbers and the rate per million
population for kidney and liver transplants (which together constitute nearly
90% of all transplants) in 2009, the year before the World Health Assembly
adopted the revised WHO Guiding Principles. The difference between the
average population rates at which transplantation occurs in the highest-ranking
region (the Americas) and the lowest-ranking region (Sub-Saharan Africa) is
more than 50 fold for kidney transplants and 188 fold for liver transplants.
These data are useful in gaining a general understanding of regional
patterns, but further illumination depends on looking at specific countries and
their organ sources. The jurisdictions with the highest rates for transplantation
of all organs (greater than or equal to 75 per million population) are the United
States and many Western European countries; the group with the next highest
rate (from 50 to 74.9 per million population) consists of the rest of Western
Europe, Turkey, Canada, Australia, and South Korea. Not surprisingly, all of

do not yet have comprehensive registries on organ transplantation. Id.
30. Id.
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these countries score “very high” on the Human Development Index (HDI),
32
save Turkey, which scores “high.” Moreover, the data reported by the Global
Observatory on Donation and Transplantation show that of the countries with
kidney-transplant rates above 40 per million population, all 14 are at the “very
high” level on the HDI, and even expanding the range to 20 per million
population adds 20 more “very high” HDI countries, along with nine more in
33
the “medium” to “high” range on the HDI.
In some ways, however, any rates that combine data on organs obtained
from living and deceased donors are not the most revealing, at least not as to
the issues of transplant tourism and payments for kidneys, which—outside of
34
China—have principally involved unrelated living donors. Among the
countries that are near the top in the rate at which kidneys are obtained from
either living or deceased donors per million population, only the United States
(second overall) ranks high in its rate of both deceased donation (eighth) and
living donation (ninth) in the 2011 report. Most of the leading countries on one
list do not rank high on the other. Other than the United States, among the
countries that are in the global top ten in the rate of deceased kidney donors,
only Norway (at twenty-second) appears among the top thirty-three countries
ranked by the rate of living kidney donation. Most countries rely on one mode
of donation or the other; even the Netherlands, which has about an equal
number of living and deceased donors and ranks fifth globally in its combined
rate of kidney transplantation, comes in fourth in living donation but twentyfirst in deceased donation, far behind most of its neighbors in Europe.
Although many of the countries that have long had reputations as being
“hotspots” for transplant tourism—such as Egypt, Turkey, Costa Rica, and
35
Mexico —appear near the top of the list of countries with high rates of living
kidney donors per million population, many other places where purchases of
kidneys from living persons have been prevalent—such as India, Pakistan and

31. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014, at
160 tbl.1 (2014), available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14-report-en-1.pdf.
32. Id.
33. GLOBAL OBSERVATORY ON DONATION & TRANSPLANTATION, 2011 DATA, supra note 28, at
17.
34. Living donors are obviously not relevant for most nonrenal organs, although the donation by
living donors of a portion of the liver does make up a small percentage of all liver transplants in many
countries and a majority of liver transplants in several countries in the Middle and Far East such as
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Mongolia (in all of which virtually no deceased donors were being used in
liver transplantation as of 2011) and Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Japan, and South Korea (where the number
of living donors far exceeds the number of deceased liver donors). GLOBAL OBSERVATORY ON
DONATION & TRANSPLANTATION, 2011 DATA, supra note 28, at 13.
35. Gabriel M. Danovitch et al., Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism: The Role of Global
Professional Ethical Standards—The 2008 Declaration of Istanbul, 95 TRANSPLANTATION 1306, 1307
(2013) [hereinafter Danovitch et al., Global Standards]; see Jose Melendez, How Costa Rica Became the
Center of Global Human-Organ Trafficking Ring, EL PAIS (Mar. 17, 2014, 9:05 PM),
http://elpais.com/elpais/2014/03/17/inenglish/1395085976_320480.html; Andrew O’Reilly, Organ
NEWS
LATINO
(Aug.
16,
2012),
Trafficking
on
the
Rise,
FOX
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/08/16/organ-trafficking-on-rise-in-united-states/.
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the Philippines —do not. This is because significant portions of the transplants
that occur in the latter countries are performed on foreigners. Lacking a
comprehensive program of organ replacement for their domestic populations,
these countries’ low kidney-transplant rates reflect the relatively modest total
number of procedures done for wealthy or well-insured foreign and domestic
patients divided by the countries’ large populations.
Most significantly, the global data collected by WHO do not differentiate
between related and unrelated living donation. Until recently, most of the
problematic cases of commercial donation have been in the latter category.
When, for example, the Indian parliament responded to the 1991 WHO
Guiding Principles by enacting the Transplantation of Human Organs Act
37
38
1994, the number of kidney sales in India initially fell drastically —and then
rose quickly and markedly elsewhere, particularly in Pakistan and the
39
Philippines.
B. Global Efforts to Strengthen Ethical and Legal Norms
India was one of about fifty countries that undertook to reform their
practices following the approval of WHO’s original Guiding Principles. These
countries adopted laws in the early 1990s to institute the anticommercial system
recommended by WHO. Similarly, a number of countries—including several
that were centers for organ sales, such as Pakistan and the Philippines, and
other countries, such as Israel, that had sent large numbers of “transplant
40
tourists” abroad to receive vended kidneys —have adopted laws and
regulations in the past few years that aim to put the 2010 WHO Guiding
36. Danovitch et al., Global Standards, supra note 35, at 1308–09. For data on transplant rates in
all these countries, see GLOBAL OBSERVATORY ON DONATION & TRANSPLANTATION, 2011 DATA,
supra note 28.
37. No. 42, Acts of Parliament, 1994 (India); see LILY SRIYASTAVA, LAW & MEDICINE 103 (2010).
38. The rate then crept back up over the following fifteen years due to loopholes in the statute and
its 1995 implementing regulations. The Transplantation of Human Organs Rules, 1995, 51(E) Gen. S.
R. & O. Section 9(3) of Chapter II of the 1994 Act allowed donations by unrelated persons acting out
of “affection and attachment” for a recipient, and under the regulations the state-appointed
Authorization Committees were permitted to approve unrelated transplants on grounds of “affection
or attachments or . . . any special reasons.” Id. It has been reported that this provision was widely
abused by the committees, which, either out of pity for potential recipients or because they were
bribed, approved “many poor, illiterate, out of work strangers [who had] developed enough affection
for rich recipients from far off places whom they ha[d] either never met or just seen a couple of times”
to serve as donors to those recipients. Vivek Jha, Paid Transplants in India: The Grim Reality, 3
NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS TRANSPLANTATION 541, 542 (2004). “The majority of applications to the
[Authorizing Committee (AC)] are usually accepted. Most unrelated donations occur when the donor
expresses their true affection for the recipient in front of the AC. Between 1995 and 2002, there were
about 5,000 cases interviewed by the AC in Tamil Nadu with a rejection rate of less than 5%.” Sunil
Shroff, Legal and ethical aspects of organ donation and transplantation, 25 INDIAN J. UROLOGY 348,
352 (2009).
39. Yosuke Shimazono, The State of the International Organ Trade: A Provisional Picture Based
on Integration of Available Information, 85 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 955, 957 (2007).
40. See, e.g., Benita Padilla et al., Impact of Legal Measures Prevent Transplant Tourism: The
Interrelated Experience of the Philippines and Israel, 16 MED. HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 915, 915–16
(2013).
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41

Principles into effect. These changes have been strongly supported by other
42
43
intergovernmental bodies such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe,
44
and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, all of which have addressed the
45
phenomena of organ trafficking and of people being trafficked for the removal
46
of the organs.
Equally significant in driving ethical and legal reforms have been the
advocacy efforts of leaders in transplantation medicine. For example, the
Transplantation Society (TTS) and the International Society of Nephrology
organized a global summit on organ trafficking and transplant tourism in
Istanbul in late April 2008, where a statement of professional opposition to
47
organ markets, the Declaration of Istanbul, was adopted. The Declaration of
Istanbul has since been endorsed by more than 120 medical organizations and
48
governmental agencies. Realizing that the declaration would not be selfimplementing, its creators formed the Declaration of Istanbul Custodian Group
49
(DICG) in 2010 to encourage adherence to its principles and proposals. The
DICG and TTS have produced some notable results by calling on government
officials to adopt and enforce prohibitions, and by making clear to them the
harm done to the standing of medical professionals who work in locales where
50
organ sales are widespread. Furthermore, the DICG’s direct interventions to
41. Id at 916–17.
42. See, e.g., United Nations Global Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons, G.A. Res.
64/293, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/293 (August 12, 2010); Preventing, Combating and Punishing Trafficking
in Human Organs, G.A. Res. 59/156, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/156 (December 20, 2004).
43. Marta López-Fraga et al., supra note 18, at 2187–88.
44. See GLOBAL PROGRAMME AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS, U.N. OFFICE ON
DRUGS & CRIME, TOOLKIT TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 494–500 (2008), available at
http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/HT_Toolkit08_English.pdf.
45. Alireza Bagheri & Francis L. Delmonico, Global Initiatives to Tackle Organ Trafficking and
Transplant Tourism, 16 MED. HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 887, 892–93 (2013).
46. The focus of this analysis is on programs, operated by hospitals or others, in which living
donors or the family of deceased donors are given money or something else of material value to agree
to organ donation, rather than on the variety of human trafficking and other criminal activities that
have arisen on the periphery of organ transplantation and that have, arguably been facilitated by the
existence of commercial organ donation. For more on those peripheral activities, see, for example,
Frederike Ambagtsheer, Damian Zaitch & Willem Weimar, The Battle for Human Organs: Organ
Trafficking and Transplant Tourism in a Global Context, 14 GLOBAL CRIME 1 (2013).
47. See supra note 27 and sources cited therein.
48. See
Endorsing
Organizations,
DECLARATION
OF
ISTANBUL,
http://www.declarationofistanbul.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=74&Itemid=56
(last visited May 8, 2013).
49. See Declaration of Istanbul Custodian Group, DECLARATION OF ISTANBUL,
http://www.declarationofistanbul.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=73&Itemid=59
(last visited Jun. 14, 2014).
50. Danovitch et al., Global Standards, supra note 35, at 1308 (citing, for example, Spain’s
acknowledgement of the Declaration of Istanbul when it modified its penal code to provide penalties
for trafficking in organs and trafficking in people for organ removal); Francis Delmonico et al., Open
Letter to Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China: China’s Fight Against Corruption in
Organ Transplantation, 97 TRANSPLANTATION 795, 796 (2014) [hereinafter Delmonico et al., Open
Letter] (urging the government to adhere to its 2007 organ-transplant regulations and 2013 Hangzhou
Resolution, both adopted with aid and encouragement of the international organizations).
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51

change professional practices have been even more successful. For instance,
academic recognition has been withheld from physicians who have carried out
transplants with organs from executed prisoners by barring the physicians’
52
abstracts from inclusion in international medical congresses. Many medical
journals have announced that they expect adherence to the Declaration of
Istanbul by their authors, just as they have long insisted that research conducted
with human beings must adhere to the Declaration of Helsinki, first
53
promulgated by the World Medical Association in 1964. In at least one
instance, several articles were retracted from an academic journal when it was
discovered that the work discussed involved living donors who had been paid to
54
supply a kidney.
C. Recent National Changes in Response to Global Norms
Bringing about thoroughgoing changes in transplant practices requires more
than academic and professional sanctions; governments must also adopt and
enforce bans on organ purchases and transplant tourism. The latter has proven
particularly difficult, not the least because of the built-in opposition of the
people who have profited from catering to transplant tourists. Accordingly, the
hard-won gains in this regard that have been achieved in the past five years are
all the more remarkable.
Some local proponents of organ-trade prohibitions have successfully used
global standards in their transformative efforts. This is illustrated by the
experiences of Pakistan where the Transplantation of Human Organs and
Tissues Ordinance was adopted by presidential decree in 2007 before becoming
55
a parliamentary act in 2010. Before the ordinance, an estimated 1500 patients
from other countries—principally in the Middle East—as well as about 500
wealthy Pakistanis received vended kidneys each year, mainly in private
56
hospitals and clinics in Lahore and other Punjab cities. The efforts to bring
that practice to an end were lead by the professionals associated with the Sindh
Institute of Urology and Transplantation (SIUT), a medical center in Karachi
that provides donation-driven kidney dialysis and transplantation to all patients
without charge. SIUT supplied the “moral entrepreneurs: groups and
51. Danovitch et al., Global Standards, supra note 35, at 1308.
52. Gabriel Danovitch, Michael Shapiro & Jacob Lavee, The Use of Executed Prisoners as a
Source of Organs Must Stop, 11 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 426, 427 (2011); Delmonico et al., Open
Letter, supra note 50, at 795 (describing the reasons for this “academic embargo”).
53. Letter from Exec. Comm., Declaration of Istanbul Custodian Grp., to Nuffield Council on
Bioethics (July 2010), available at http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/sites/default/files/files/Declaration%
20of%20Istanbul%20Custodian%20Group.pdf.
54. Adam Marcus, Transplant Journal Retracts Three Papers over Possible Organ Trafficking,
RETRACTION WATCH (Feb. 12, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://retractionwatch.wordpress.com/2013/02/12/
transplant-journal-retracts-three-papers-over-possible-organ-trafficking/.
55. K.M. Bile et al., Human Organ and Tissue Transplantation in Pakistan: When a Regulation
Makes a Difference, 16 E. MEDITERRANEAN HEALTH J. S159, S161 (2010).
56. S.A.H. Rizvi et al., Pakistan Abolishes Kidney Market and Ushers in a New Era of Ethical
Transplantation, 1 INT. J. ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION MED. 193, 194–95 (2010).
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individuals in civil society who are committed to the elimination of trade they
57
consider harmful and repugnant,” who mobilized public opposition to
commercial organ donation. They urged the government to adopt the new law.
Descriptions written by SIUT physicians of the socioeconomic realities of the
58
59
organ trade and of the resulting hazards to both donors and recipients led to
60
critical reporting of the practice in newspapers and on television.
The media coverage took specific aim at the role of the government, whose
failed poverty-alleviation programs left individuals no choice but to sell their
kidneys, and whose failure to enact a transplant law and later to enforce it
allowed the organ trade to thrive. It was also noted that reports of Pakistan’s
“flourishing kidney market” had appeared in the international press, tarnishing
61
the country’s reputation.
The owners of the private hospitals who profited greatly from transplant
commercialism and who had strong connections to high-level officials mounted
fierce opposition to the transplant bill and sought to water down its prohibitions
62
on unrelated living donation. On the other side, SIUT’s founder and director,
Professor Adib Rizvi, used his strong connections with international medical
groups, particularly his membership in the DICG, to counteract these powerful
63
opponents. Prominent transplant surgeons among the DICG leadership came
to Pakistan to convince government officials that organ sales were a matter of
international concern and needed to be curbed to rehabilitate the reputation of
64
Pakistani physicians. As Professor Asif Esrat concludes, “For government
officials, the desire to conform to widely held international norms and redeem
65
the national reputation served as a motivation for action.” When the law was
contested in a federal Shariat court as an interference with the Islamic duty to
save life, the existence of the international standards, as embodied in the WHO
Guiding Principles (which Pakistan had joined in endorsing at the World Health
66
Assembly), weighed heavily enough that the court rejected the challenge.
57. Asif Efrat, The Politics of Combating the Organ Trade: Lessons from the Israeli and Pakistani
Experience, 13 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1650, 1651 (2013).
58. See, e.g., Farhat Moazam et al., Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An
Ethnographic Study, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–June 2009, at 29–44.
59. See, e.g., S.A.A. Naqvi et al., Health Status and Renal Function Evaluation of Kidney Vendors:
A Report from Pakistan, 8 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1444, 1445–49 (2008).
60. Efrat, supra note 57, at 1652.
61. Id.
62. Bile et al., supra note 55.
63. See S.A.H. Rizvi et al., A Renal Transplantation Model for Developing Countries, 11 AM. J.
TRANSPLANTATION 2302 (2011). The support of WHO came both from its headquarters in Geneva and
from Dr. Khalif Bile Mohamud, the WHO representative in Pakistan. See, e.g., Bile, supra note 55;
Letter from Dr. Khalif Bile Mohamud, WHO Representative in Pak., to Major Gen. R. Muhammad
Aslam, Dir. of Gen. Health, Ministry of Health, Gov’t of Pak. (Feb. 13, 2004) (on file with Law and
Contemporary Problems).
64. Efrat, supra note 57, at 1652.
65. Id.
66. Farhat Moazam, Sharia Law and Organ Transplantation: Through the Lens of Muslim Jurists,
3 ASIAN BIOETHICS REV. 316, 328–29 (2011).
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When several transplant programs continued to carry out commercial
transplants, including on patients from abroad, Dr. Rizvi and his colleagues
reported these violations to the authorities and prosecutions were brought
against the surgeons and hospitals that had attempted to profit by breaking the
67
law.
The current situation in the Philippines resembles that in Pakistan in some
ways but differs in significant respects. The country has been a well-known
locale for organ purchases for the past several decades; indeed, it was one of the
first places where the anthropologists of Organs Watch, an independent
research and medical-human-rights project at the University of California,
Berkeley, began their examination of the “new body trade” in which “the
circulation of kidneys follows established routes of capital from South to North,
from East to West, from poorer to more affluent bodies, from black and brown
bodies to white ones, and from female to male or from poor, low status men to
68
more affluent men.”
Although Internet sites have made the Philippines another important locus
for the global organ trade, the initial pattern of using vended kidneys there
differed from what had occurred in Pakistan because the recipients were mainly
wealthy Filipinos, not foreigners. 358 of the 468 kidney transplants recorded in
2003 by the Renal Disease Control Program of the Department of Health in the
Philippines involved domestic patients (though the possibility of incomplete
69
reporting by private hospitals cannot be totally discounted). It was thus not
surprising that elite groups at that time supported a proposal under
consideration by the government to institutionalize paid kidney donation as
70
well as to formally accept transplantation for foreign patients. As appealing as
this idea may have seemed to someone viewing it “from a private hospital room
in Quezon City,” it was much less so for human-rights advocates trying to
protect potential organ sellers in “a sewage-infested banguay (slum) in
71
Manila.” These advocates used the attention that the World Health
Organization was bringing to the issue at that time to halt the movement toward
legalizing compensation.
Over the following five years, international pressure on the government
72
intensified, not only from intergovernmental and medical bodies but from the
Catholic hierarchy, particularly in light of press coverage about unscrupulous
organ brokers trolling in the slums for donors to meet the ever-increasing
67. S.A.H. Rizvi et al., A Renal Transplantation Model for Developing Countries, 11 AM. J.
TRANSPLANTATION 2302, 2305 (2011).
68. Scheper-Hughes, Keeping an Eye, supra note 19, at 1645.
69. Shimazono, supra note 39.
70. Id. at 956 (citing Fumiko Endo, Organ Plan Poses Ethical Issues; New RP Scheme to Allow
Kidney Trading Aims to Close Black Market, DAILY YOMIURI, Feb. 3, 2007, at 3 (Japan)).
71. Scheper-Hughes, Keeping an Eye, supra note 19, at 1645.
72. See, e.g., Leonardo D. de Castro, The Declaration of Istanbul in the Philippines: Success with
Foreigners but a Continuing Challenge for Local Transplant Tourism, 16 MED. HEALTH CARE & PHIL.
929, 930–31 (2013).
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demand for kidneys coming from Manila’s transplant tourists. On April 30,
2008, a ministerial directive barred foreign recipients from getting kidneys from
74
Filipino living donors. The next year, the Inter-Agency Council Against
Trafficking followed the international trend and used the organ trafficking
provisions of the Philippines’ Anti-Human Trafficking Law as the basis for
supplemental regulations outlawing all organ purchases, as well as other means
of trafficking persons for organ removal, including the use of force, fraud, and
75
taking advantage of vulnerability.
The fragility of these legal changes in the face of the determined opposition
is indicated by the next swing of the Filipino organ-policy pendulum. When
Benigno Aquino III assumed office as President in June 2010, he nominated as
secretary of health Dr. Enrique T. Ona, a transplant surgeon who had
76
previously expressed his opposition to the ban on organ sales. The nomination
was held up, however, when Ona announced his intention to allow organ
77
donors to be compensated by a $3200 “gratuity package” and joined several
American regulated-market advocates in sponsoring an international forum on
78
“Incentives for Donation” in Manila that November. He was confirmed as
health minister, however, after providing assurances that he would not institute
financial “gratuities,” but he did sign the proposal for incentives that emerged
79
from the international forum. In effect, the pendulum has swung back, as the
number of foreign transplant recipients, which had risen to 531 by 2007 before
the ban, fell to two by 2011, even as a threefold increase occurred in deceased80
donor transplants for Filipinos. Movement in the opposite direction remains
possible, however, as organ purchases by wealthy Filipinos have not completely
disappeared, with brokers helping potential kidney recipients persuade review
committees to allow as “emotionally related” donations what are in fact
81
commercial transactions.
Another variation on the theme of transplant tourism has taken place in
Colombia, which “was a major provider of deceased-donor organs for wealthy

73. Carlos H. Conde, The Philippines: No More Kidneys for Foreigners, Government Decrees, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 2008, at A11.
74. Id.
75. INTER-AGENCY COUNCIL AGAINST TRAFFICKING, RULES AND REGULATIONS
IMPLEMENTING SECTION 4(G) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9208, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ANTITRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ACT OF 2003, IN RELATION TO SECTION 3(A) OF THE SAME ACT, ON THE
TRAFFICKING OF PERSONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF REMOVAL OR SALE OF ORGANS (June 2009),
available at http://www.transplant-observatory.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/wprlegethphl6.pdf.
76. David Dizon, DOH To Lift Ban on Organ Donations for Foreigners, ABS CBN NEWS.COM
(Jul. 2, 2010, 6:55 PM), http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/07/02/10/doh-lift-ban-organ-donationsforeigners.
77. Id.
78. Working Group on Incentives for Living Donation, Incentives for Organ Donation: Proposed
Standard for an Internationally Acceptable System, 12 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 306, 311 (2012).
79. Id.
80. Danovitch et al., Global Standards, supra note 35, at 1309.
81. See de Castro, supra note 72, at 931.
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82

foreigners” during the first decade of this century, mainly for liver
83
transplantation. With strong international and regional backing, local medical
leaders succeeded in redirecting organs to recipients from Colombia and
neighboring countries. The annual rate of transplantation to foreigners, which
stood at 200 in 2005 (16.5% of the national total), was reduced to 10 by 2011
84
(0.9% of the total, down from 1.45% the prior year).
The situation in Colombia is indicative of the progress that has been made
across Latin America with the adoption by the Ibero-American Council of a set
of principles and objectives in a regional parallel to the Declaration of Istanbul,
85
the Document of Aguascalientes, which was encouraged through a strong
alliance with the Spanish transplant program. The Document of Aguascalientes
has provided legal and ethical as well as technical guidance for countries across
that region as they have created or strengthened their own systems for organ
donation, allocation, and transplantation that seek the support of the public and
medical professionals and that aim to meet the transplant needs of the domestic
population and achieve “self-sufficiency” nationally or through regional
86
cooperation.
Over the past five years, the most impressive examples of countries that
have responded to stronger global norms regarding the opposite side of “selfsufficiency”—namely, not sending transplant tourists abroad as the means to
meet domestic demand for organs—are in the Middle East. Israel’s enactment
in 2008 of legislation halting insurance coverage for commercial transplants that
violate local laws ended its reliance on Turkey, South Africa, China, and the
Philippines, among other countries, as sites where Israeli patients could go to
87
obtain vended kidneys. The law also stimulated the development of a robust
88
system of deceased and living-related donation, which has been widely praised.
82. Danovitch et al., Global Standards, supra note 35, at 1309.
83. Francis L. Delmonico, The Implications of Istanbul Declaration on Organ Trafficking and
Transplant Tourism, 14 CURRENT OPINION IN ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 116, 117 (2009).
84. INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE SALUD, INFORME ANUAL RED DONACIÓN Y TRASPLANTES
[DONATION AND TRANSPLANT NETWORK ANNUAL REPORT] 26 (2012).
85. See Ashley Baquero & Josefina Alberú, Ethical Challenges in Transplant Practice in Latin
America: The Aguascalientes Document, 31 NEFROLOGIA 275, 275 (2011) (Spain).
86. See, e.g., The Madrid Resolution on Organ Donation and Transplantation: National
Responsibility in Meeting the Needs of Patients, Guided by the WHO Principles, 91 TRANSPLANTATION
(SUPPLEMENT 11S) S29 (2011); see also F. Delmonico, M. Dominguez-Gil, R. Matesanz & L. Noel, A
Call for Government Accountability to Achieve National Self-Sufficiency in Organ Donation and
Transplantation, 378 LANCET 1414 (2011) (articulating the rationale for a new paradigm of selfsufficiency in which each country or region would strive to provide a sufficient number of organs from
within its own population).
87. Gabriel M. Danovitch, The High Cost of Organ Transplant Commercialism, 85 KIDNEY INT’L
248, 250 (2014).
88. See, e.g. Danovitch et al., Global Standards, supra note 35, at 1309–10; Efrat, supra note 57, at
1652–53; Padilla, supra note 40, at 918–19. Drs. Jacob Lavee and Avraham Stoler provide a
comprehensive analysis of the Israeli donation program in their contribution to this issue of Law and
Contemporary Problems. See Jacob Lavee & Avraham Stoler, Reciprocal Altruism: The Impact of
Resurrecting an Old Moral Imperative on the National Organ Donation Rate in Israel, 77 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2014, at 323.
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A number of Arab countries have taken steps—thus far less sweeping in
scope or impact than the Israeli program but still effective—to treat patients at
home rather than sending them abroad. The evolution of policy in Qatar
provides a vivid example of the competing forces at work: expediency, selfinterest, generosity, and concern about adhering to international norms. The
local provider of transplant services, the Hamad Medical Corporation (HMC),
has concluded that it needs to go beyond the existing Qatari program for
89
honoring donors if it is to achieve self-sufficiency in organ transplantation.
Consequently, the HMC increased outreach within the expatriate community in
Qatar (more than 85% of residents) to ensure that they too have access to
90
transplantation services. Additionally, the HMC has substantially increased
91
deceased donation by publicizing that “brain death” is acceptable under Islam
and by having prominent persons, such as members of the royal family, not only
recognize the generosity of living donors and the families of deceased donors
92
but also enroll in the organ-donor registry.
A central component of the new Qatari program is the Doha Donation
93
Accord, which was formulated in November 2009 with assistance from the
leaders of the DICG and the International Society for Organ Transplantation,
and which came into effect in 2010 following approval by the country’s Supreme
Council of Health. The accord aimed to combat organ commercialism, to create
a deceased-donor program in which everyone—whether citizen or foreign
worker—would participate as both a potential donor and potential recipient,
94
and to provide a path to self-sufficiency in organ transplantation. The original
accord departed from practices elsewhere in the region by not offering any
95
financial payment to the families of donors, but several of its promises—in

89. Donate Life, International Organ Donation News—Doha, UAE, Aims To Promote Organ
Donation, ORGAN & TISSUE DONATION BLOG (Nov. 20, 2009), http://donatelifeorgandonation.blogspot.com/2009/11/international-organ-donation-news-doha.html (last visited July
18, 2013) (quoting HMC Managing Director Dr. Hanan Al Kuwari as stating that “since our first renal
transplant in 1986, HMC has struggled to acquire the appropriate number of donors to develop our
organ transplant programme[; d]espite our frequent campaigns to promote a culture of donation, the
gap between the available organs and our waiting list has pushed many of our patients to go abroad for
organ transplants,” and noting that Dr. Al Kuwari stressed the need for Qatar to meet the organ
requirements of its citizens from within its own population).
90. See SUPREME COUNCIL OF HEALTH, SCH ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 41 (2013) (Qatar),
available at http://www.nhsq.info/app/media/540; Supreme Council of Health, Putting Ethics Into
Practice, QATAR HEALTH, Jan. 1, 2014, at 10, 12 [hereinafter Supreme Council of Health, Putting
Ethics Into Practice], available at http://www.nhsq.info/app/media/1196.
91. Supreme Council of Health, Putting Ethics Into Practice, supra note 90, at 14.
92. Press Release, Hamad Med. Corp., Huge Surge of Support for Organ Donation as People of
All Nationalities Follow Her Highness Sheikha Moza Bint Nasser’s Lead (Sept. 2, 2012), available at
http://www.hmc.org.qa/en/hcp/news_and_features/news/september_2012/press_release_02_09_12.aspx.
93. HAMAD
MED.
CORP.,
DOHA
DONATION
ACCORD
(2010),
available
at
http://organdonation.hamad.qa/en/images/Doha_Donation_Accord.pdf.
94. Hanan Alkuwari, et al., The Doha Donation Accord Aligned With the Declaration of Istanbul:
Implementations to Develop Deceased Organ Donation and Combat Commercialism, 97
TRANSPLANTATION 3, 4 (2014).
95. Some form of family support is available, from a government foundation, in the case of all
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particular, that a their family member would be offered a free airplane ticket to
accompany the deceased’s body from Qatar “at the time of donation”—do not
align with Guiding Principle 5 of the WHO Guiding Principles, which states that
“[c]ells, tissues and organs should only be donated freely, without any monetary
96
payment or other reward of monetary value.” To the accord’s framers, it
would have been inconsistent with cultural norms of reciprocal gift-giving not to
provide something of value to those who agree to donate organs for
transplantation. To outsiders, however, such a provision seemed to exploit the
vulnerable situation of the families of Qatar’s manual laborers and domestic
workers from India, Nepal, the Philippines, and other developing countries,
97
who would otherwise find it difficult to repatriate their loved one’s remains.
At a meeting in Doha in April 2013, held to mark the fifth anniversary of
the Declaration of Istanbul, the leaders of the HMC transplant program
acknowledged the remaining shortcomings in the Doha Donation Accord and
98
pledged to make revisions satisfactory to the DICG. In particular, they
pledged to ensure that any benefits provided to donors’ families would be
offered to the families of all potential donors, irrespective of whether they agree
to donate their deceased relative’s organs for transplantation; further,
[A] social welfare program at HMC, in association with Qatar charities, provides
assistance where required to patients and their families. This assists in securing longterm medical care, supply of medications, and financial support during residency in
Qatar and sometimes following the return home of expatriates. For example,
following a formal socioeconomic evaluation, social services provide support to
eligible families of all patients who die within HMC hospitals, including families
resident abroad. [W]hile the team at the Organ Donation Centre may directly refer
families of critically ill patients to welfare services for assistance as part of their
routine care, such referrals and provision of welfare benefits are unrelated to donation
99
decisions—a point that is made clear to families.

deaths in Qatar, and “[i]n the course of their engagement with potential donor families, donor
coordinators may also facilitate referral to social support services where needed, irrespective of
whether consent is provided for donation.” Id. at 4.
96. World Health Org. Secretariat, supra note 23, at 9. The commentary on Guiding Principle 5
notes that the principle “allows for circumstances where it is customary to provide donors with tokens
of gratitude that cannot be assigned a value in monetary terms. National law should ensure that any
gifts or rewards are not, in fact, disguised forms of payment for donated cells, tissues or organs.” Id.
The commentary goes on to observe that “[w]hile the worst abuses involve living donors, dangers also
arise when payments . . . are made to next of kin of deceased persons.” Id. Guiding Principle 5 is not
violated by the practice of transferring the coffin to the deceased’s homeland because, as the Doha
Donation Accord notes, this is done irrespective of organ donor status, pursuant to Qatari law
applicable to the death of all foreign workers. See Law No. 4 of 2009 Regarding Regulation of the
Expatriates
Entry,
Departure,
Residence
and
Sponsorship,
art.
4,
available
at
http://www.almeezan.qa/LawPage.aspx?id=2611&language=en.
97. Owen Gibson, More Than 500 Indian Workers Have Died in Qatar Since 2012, Figures Show,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2014, 12:33 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/18/qatar-worldcup-india-migrant-worker-deaths.
98. Danovitch et al., Global Standards, supra note 35, at 1310.
99. Dominique Martin & Riadh A.S. Fadhil, The Doha Model of Organ Donation and
Transplantation: Thinking Beyond Citizenship 2 GRIFFITH J. L. & HUM. DIGNITY 293, 300–01 (2014).
The provision of welfare benefits does not appear to be essential for a decision to donate. Between
January 2011 and May 2014, only four of the eighteen families who gave consent to donation (out of 98
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The forces at play in the movement of Qatar toward a more self-sufficient
program of organ transplantation are the same as those that have operated in
the other countries described. In the countries that have provided transplants to
large numbers of transplant tourists, the forces favoring payments to living
donors have largely been controlled by those who directly profit from this
business. But in Qatar, as in other countries that have sent most of their
potential kidney and liver recipients abroad for transplantation, those who had
supported transplant tourism shifted toward favoring payments to donors in
Qatar, because they do not believe a domestic transplant program can be built
100
without such financial rewards. In a setting like Qatar where the population is
sharply divided in both socioeconomic and ethnic terms, as well as by residents’
degree of integration in, and identification with, the country and its institutions,
it is particularly easy to understand the view that those who are disadvantaged
and disenfranchised will only respond to a request for assistance—in the form
of a life-saving organ—when it is accompanied by an offer to improve their
condition materially. Nevertheless, the forces on the other side have been
successful—as they have been in Pakistan and the Philippines—in finding ways
of overcoming the barriers to voluntary donation that do not link benefits to an
101
agreement to donate.
In all these settings, the local medical and human rights advocates opposed
to giving material rewards for organ donation have been inspired by
professional and intergovernmental statements of principle and have derived
strength from the medical leaders and WHO officials who have assisted them in
persuading their governments to align national laws and practices with
international norms.

families who were contacted by the donation team because of a “brain dead” family member in the
HMC intensive care unit) had been granted benefits; seven other families that required financial
support did not give permission for organ donation. Id. at 301.
100. In 2006, the Mobile Donor Action Team in the Riyadh region of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(Qatar’s neighbor) adopted an “Incentive-Based Payment System” to overcome a low rate of consent
by the families of potential organ donors. This team’s success in increasing the rate of donation appears
to have had several causes but some observers attribute it to the financial incentives paid to donor
families and believe “[o]ther Middle Eastern countries may have a similar outcome.” Mohammed I.
Sebayel, Donor Organ Shortage Crisis: A Case Study Review of an Economic-Incentive System 52
(June 2010) (unpublished M.P.H. Dissertation, University of of Liverpool), available at
www.palts.org/Sebayel_MPH_thesis.pdf.
101. The results in Qatar have been dramatic: The establishment of a registry for deceased
donation has helped increase the level of deceased donation threefold between 2011 and 2013, and
Qataris have started becoming living donors for family members (with seventeen related persons being
prepared to donate a kidney in December 2013, a large number given that there are fewer than 300,000
Qatari citizens—equivalent to 59 donors per million population, well above the highest rate of living–
kidney donor rate of almost 30 per million population in the two developed nations with the highest
rates, Japan and the Netherlands). The increased opportunities for transplants within Qatar have
resulted in a ninety-percent reduction in the rate at which patients travel abroad for transplants.
Supreme Council of Health, Putting Ethics Into Practice, supra note 90, at 12–14.
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IV
BENEFITS, COSTS, AND INTERCONNECTIONS
National patterns of organ donation can be expected to be less diverse in the
future, thanks to changes of the sort detailed above, as countries move away
from their former roles as buyers or sellers in what has been called “the global
102
traffic in human organs.” But progress toward a world in which all countries
103
where organ transplants are performed rely on deceased and living-related
donors, rather than paying living donors and the families of cadaver donors, has
been halting, and the outcome is far from assured. To a large extent, the
changes that have occurred have been heavily influenced by the WHO Guiding
Principles and the Declaration of Istanbul, which, in turn, rest on the consistent
practice of noncommercial organ donation in the United States, Canada, and
Western Europe for more than four decades. The hands-on advocacy of WHO
and DICG leaders has conveyed this vision to the responsible authorities in
countries that have previously relied on paid organ vendors, and it has
reinforced the efforts of local medical leaders to reform national laws and
practices.
But if systems that have so long embodied the ideal of voluntary, altruistic
solidarity as their basis for organ donation and that have thereby attained the
highest rates of donation were to move to a “regulated market” with financial
inducements for donation, the progress achieved in countries that have only
recently come into line with, or that have been moving in the direction of, the
WHO Guiding Principles and the Declaration of Istanbul would reverse course
in short order. The proponents of paying for organs in those countries—
whether they be surgeons and brokers who stand to profit from transplant
tourists or those who believe it is necessary to offer material expressions of
104
gratitude in order to build a functioning organ-transplant system —would seize
upon the change of policy in the West and say, “Clearly, no principle is
offended by the sale and purchase of organs, for these enlightened countries
allow it; and if these countries, which are rich and medically well equipped, find
payment necessary to generate an adequate supply of organs, how can we

102. Scheper-Hughes, The Global Traffic in Human Organs, supra note 20, at 191.
103. For many low-resource countries that struggle to provide basic primary health care to their
whole population, it would seem difficult to justify the creation of an organ-donation and transplant
program. Where such programs exist in low-resource countries, two rationales are most commonly
offered. First, once a country offers dialysis services, it is much more cost-effective to transplant
kidneys and move patients off dialysis; second, the development of a transplant program (a process that
is often assisted by medical experts and organizations from developed countries) can help improve the
quality of surgical care generally and serve to keep qualified surgeons from emigrating to countries with
better-equipped health-care facilities. See The Madrid Resolution on Organ Donation and
Transplantation, supra note 86, at S29–S30.
104. See, e.g., Anne Griffin, Kidneys on Demand, 334 BRIT. MED. J. 502, 505 (2007) (quoting Dr.
Behrooz Broumand, a past president of the Iranian Society of Nephrology, as stating that although paid
living unrelated donation may be a “temporary” but “not a long term” solution for developing
countries, it allowed Iran to increase facilities and manpower and develop a base on which the technical
capacity for cadaveric transplants could be expanded).
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succeed in any way other than by following their example?”
Two questions are thus presented. First, are there good reasons to believe
that all countries would be better off with some form of a “regulated market” in
organs? Second, when policymakers in North America and Western Europe
consider whether to adopt such a system, should they take into account the
effect that such a change in their laws would have on the remaining countries,
many of which are only now overcoming histories of organ vending that even
105
advocates for regulated organ markets admit were rife with abuses?
A. A Market in Organs: Practical Challenges
The first question needs to be tackled in two steps: How might organ
markets operate, and would they be better than current norms against paying
for organs? At the threshold, some proponents of using “inducements” to
increase organ donation object to the description of the resulting situation as a
“market.” Some inducements (which may either involve providing a benefit or
withholding a negative consequence) might not create what would normally be
106
called a market. An action can be induced by the desire to receive public
recognition or praise without creating a market governed by particular “praise
prices.” Likewise, people who fear that donating one kidney might someday
leave them needing a replacement, should their remaining kidney fail, could be
induced to donate by the assurance that should the need arise, they would be
placed at the head of the queue for a transplant. But when inducements involve
cash (paid directly to the donor or to a donor’s chosen beneficiary) or
something else of material value (health or life insurance, contributions to fund
college tuition or retirement, and the like), the result is a market.
Of course, proponents of organ markets recognize the risks—amply
107
manifested in countries where organ sales have existed for years —and insist
108
that what is needed is a “regulated market.” Market regulation comes in

105. See, e.g., James Stacey Taylor & Mary C. Simmerling, Donor Compensation without
Exploitation, in WHEN ALTRUISM ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR COMPENSATING KIDNEY DONORS
50, 51 (Sally Satel ed., 2008) (arguing that “a regulated and transparent regime” would provide a
remedy for “the corrupt and unregulated system” in which “disadvantaged members [of society] feel
unduly pressured by financial necessity to give up parts of their bodies to the advantaged who can
afford them”).
106. Some of the strategies that have been used successfully—and some particularly ingenious ones
suggested by authors in this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems (see, for example, Kimberly D.
Krawiec & Michael A. Rees, Reverse Transplant Tourism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2014, at
145)—involve nonfinancial inducements, which are not the object of this article’s critique of markets.
107. See Scheper-Hughes, The Global Traffic in Human Organs, supra note 20, at 195.
108. Advocates sometimes speak of “markets” and sometimes use the less descriptive term
“systems.” See David C. Cronin II and Julio J. Elias, Operational Organization of a System for
Compensated Living Organ Providers, in WHEN ALTRUISM ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR
COMPENSATING KIDNEY DONORS, supra note 105, at 34, 35, 37 (comparing a “regulated, centralized
system” with an “unregulated market for kidneys”); Elbert Huang, Nidhi Thakur & David O. Meltzer,
The Cost-Effectiveness of Renal Transplantation, in WHEN ALTRUISM ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR
COMPENSATING KIDNEY DONORS, supra note 105, at 19, 32 (contrasting the value of a kidney on the
“black market” and on a “regulated, legal market”); Sally Satel, Introduction to WHEN ALTRUISM
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several forms. The first involves price regulation, namely fixing the type and
amount of the incentive provided, which is the approach taken by the working
109
group that ran the meeting on incentives in Manila in November 2010. Fixed
prices are attractive to those who favor organ sales for several reasons: First,
when prices are fixed, the resulting transactions can appear to be less marketlike because prices are not generated by the interplay of supply and demand as
they are in a commodity exchange or by call and response as they are at an
auction; second, a price can be fixed that is neither so low as to seem
exploitative of certain sellers’ financial desperation, nor so high as to risk
overwhelming rational, self-protective judgment.
How, then, are prices set in regulated markets? One familiar tradition
involves regulated utilities, where an administrative body fixes the prices to be
charged by the utility so as to provide the utility with a reasonable rate of return
on capital. Figuring out how to use this approach for organs would be
challenging—what is a “reasonable rate of return” for a kidney? Another
110
tradition, seen in wartime wage and price controls, is to regulate prices based
upon achieving another goal, such as preventing inflation. But such controls
provide, at best, a temporary solution because the forces the regulators try to
affect cannot be so easily tamed, and actors in the regulated market simply find
other ways to express those forces. Indeed, we owe our system of employerfunded health insurance in large part to World War II wage controls, which
employers responded to by using “benefits” (which were not restricted) as a
means of luring the workers they needed, because they were prohibited from
111
competing on wages. Today, in settings where excessive demand for healthcare services cannot be released through higher prices because prices and
supply are inflexible, consumers (patients) try to get the care they want through
side payments to providers. This phenomenon also occurs in Iran, the only
country with a regulated market in organs from living donors, where side
payments from prospective recipients to potential donors are a standard part of
112
the transaction.
The well-recognized problem with using any form of price regulation is that

ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR COMPENSATING KIDNEY DONORS, supra note 105, at 1, 9 (advocating
a “regulated compensation-based system with strong donor protections”).
109. Working Group on Incentives for Living Donation, supra note 78, at 309–11 (“[T]here should
be a fixed ‘incentive’ to the donor so that all donors in any one country receive equal payment.”).
110. Hugh Rockoff, Price Controls, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (David R.
Henderson ed., 2008), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PriceControls.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).
111. Thomas C. Buchmueller & Alan C. Monheit, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance and the
Promise of Health Insurance Reform 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14839).
112. Anne Griffin, supra note 104, at 502. In addition to a modest fixed payment from the
government ($1200), donors and recipients negotiate private side payments. Id. The transplant
foundation neither brokers the arrangement (though it facilitates it by providing a private space on-site
where the parties can agree on a price if they have not already) nor keeps records of the amount of
money exchanged. Id. at 504. To keep transplant tourists from taking advantage of the system, the law
requires that donor–recipient pairs must be the same nationality, so non-Iranians are not supposed to
be able to obtain an organ from Iranian donors. Id. at 502.
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it leads to market inefficiencies. For example, a price that is set at an arbitrarily
high level (for the reasons already mentioned) means that many sellers are paid
much more than required to induce them to exchange the item in question; in a
regulated organ market, this would result either in not having enough funds to
obtain all the organs needed for potential recipients on the waiting list or in
spending a larger amount than needed, leaving less for other pressing needs in
health care or otherwise. The inefficiency problem is exacerbated here because
it is so difficult to know where the price ought to be set. In markets, prices
ordinarily result from the intersection of supply and demand. If the government
not only set the price for kidneys but were also the sole purchasing agent, so as
to preserve the allocation system now used to assign organs from deceased
donors, then there would be no demand curve because the different values that
individuals would place on receiving a kidney transplant would not be visible.
Yet no single, objective measure is available for use by a central price setter
when calculating the value of an organ to the hypothetical average recipient or
to any particular recipients who may vary from the average but who are not
able to express how much they would pay for an organ because the price is
being set centrally rather than by individual choices. If a transplanted organ
saves a life, does it have (near) infinite value? If it extends and improves the
quality of life, should it have a price that reflects the subjective value of such
extension to each recipient? Or should the price be derived from an objective
“value of a human life,” such as the number used to evaluate the benefits
113
provided by safety regulations, which reflects the average life expectancy for
the group in question and their average projected annual earnings? If so, should
that amount be adjusted to reflect the expected length of remaining life for the
particular recipient being transplanted with a particular organ, given the
substantial variations in predicted survival associated with certain
characteristics of the organ and the recipient? For example, should a kidney
from a deceased donor be judged less valuable than one from a living donor,
given the better survival of the latter? What about downgrading the price that
Medicare should be willing to pay for organs that are intended for
transplantation into patients whose expected survival is substantially below
average, due to their age or the presence of comorbid conditions such as
114
cardiovascular disease or diabetes? Either of these adjustments makes sense
in terms of the underlying model: The price of the organ should reflect the
value that it produces in enhancing and extending a recipient’s life. Yet
adjusting what would be paid for an organ because of the recipient’s
characteristics would likely seem more problematic than adjusting because of
the organ’s characteristics.

113. K. Robin Yabroff, Estimates and Projections of Value of Life Lost From Cancer Deaths in the
United States, 100 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1755, 1755–62 (2008).
114. John Vella, Daniel C. Brennan & Alice M. Sheridan, Patient Survival after Renal
http://www.uptodate.com/contents/patient-survival-after-renalTransplantation,
UPTODATE,
transplantation (last updated Nov. 21, 2013).
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Any of these means of putting a value on a transplantable organ could yield
a huge price; one study, using a modest figure of $50,000 per quality-adjusted
life year (QALY) gained from transplantation estimated that a kidney from a
115
living unrelated donor would remain cost-effective up to a price of $306,403.
Such a figure would almost certainly exceed the willingness of public- or
private-insurance plans to pay, yet anything less might seem to underpay sellers
116
for their contribution to the “miracle of organ transplantation.” Would a
substantial price seem more justifiable if viewed from the perspective of not
exceeding the cost of the alternative treatment, namely, dialysis? Yet if so,
would that price be zero for patients who are transplanted preemptively, that is,
before they are so sick that they require dialysis? If not, should the amount
117
saved be based on the cost of dialysis for the average patient? If so, should
Medicare adjust how much it is willing to pay for a kidney for any particular
recipient in light of that patient’s expected survival on dialysis (for example, a
lower amount when the potential kidney recipient is expected to die in a few
months from another condition, such as cancer)? Further, should the
prospective value of a transplant be reduced by deducting from the average cost
of dialysis the amount already spent providing dialysis to a particular patient?
And how would the “cost savings” method of price setting be employed when
setting the price of organs for transplantation to treat conditions in which organ
failure is usually followed by rapid decline and death because no effective
treatment, such as an artificial organ, is available to sustain patients waiting for
a transplant? In other words, would the organs used in transplantation in such
cases be deemed to have little if any value?
On the opposite side, the first difficulty with presuming the flat supply curve
that results from setting a single, fixed price has already been mentioned—it can
produce either too few organs or too much spending. Another difficulty,
described below, arises from the need to determine who makes up the group of
potential suppliers. Finally, if political pressures were to lead to setting a low
price for organs—either to hold down total spending or to avoid the risk that a
high amount might seem to be aimed at persuading people to act against their
better judgment—and the program failed to clear the organ waiting lists, the
pressure to raise the level of payment would be great, though finding the right
level could remain an awkward process of trial and error.
The alternative—which true believers in inducements should embrace—
would be a genuine market with prices set by the forces of supply and demand

115. Huang, Thakur & Meltzer, supra note 108, at 31 (extrapolating from the results reported in
Arthur J. Matas & Mark A. Schnitzler, Payment for Living Donor (Vendor) Kidneys: A CostEffectiveness Analysis, 4 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 216 (2003)).
116. See Scheper-Hughes, Keeping an Eye, supra note 19, at 1647 (“[I]f regulation . . . is to be the
norm, how can a government set a fair price on the body parts of its poorest citizens without
compromising national pride, democratic values, or ethical principles?”).
117. This figure has been calculated to be $102,000, taking account only of the savings from
transplanting a kidney rather than performing dialysis, without considering the gain in QALYs. Huang,
Thakur & Meltzer, supra note 108, at 31.
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that reflect the point at which individual sellers would part with an organ and
individual buyers would part with their money to obtain one. The market would
qualify as “regulated” because of other non-price-based rules aimed at
protecting donors against abuses, such as requirements regarding postoperative
care of organ donors. On the demand side, reliance on a true market would
effectively upend the present allocation system, because successful buyers
would be those who not only place a higher value on receiving an organ
transplant but also have a greater ability to pay (whether from their own wealth
or generous medical-insurance coverage). The result would be differentiation
not only among the purchasers, with willingness to pay determining one’s place
in line, but also among the sellers, with the most desirable organs commanding
a higher price. Although some market proponents might not be bothered by
this outcome, others have suggested that it should be avoided by keeping organ
donors and recipients anonymous to each other and by having the latter pay
into the fund that supports the organ-procurement system rather than directly
118
to their donor. Yet such a system would produce both market inefficiencies
119
and strategies to get around them, of the sort previously described.
On the supply side of a true market in organs, one must begin with the
question of whether, in this era of trade liberalization, there would be any
ground for restricting donation to domestic sellers. The aversion in certain
circles to letting people from other countries come to the United States to work
really has no relevance to organ sales, because the persons involved would be
coming into the country solely as the delivery vehicles for their kidneys (or liver
lobes), and would return to their country of origin once their cargo had been
unloaded. This was indeed the vision of Dr. Jacobs, whose projected
International Kidney Exchange, Ltd. was intended to be a setting where U.S.
118. See, e.g., Working Group on Incentives for Living Donation, supra note 78, at 309.
119. The guideline that “the donation should be anonymous and nondirected” is intended by the
Working Group on Incentives for Living Donation as a means of avoiding the stratagem often used by
buyers when prices are set—to make side payments, as now occurs in the Iranian organ-procurement
system. Id. It is difficult to believe that prosecutors would prioritize pursuing violators of such a rule
(for example, those who arrange a transplant using a kidney from a donor whose “emotional
connection” to the recipient—a common ground for allowing directed donation from an unrelated
altruistic donor today—actually reflects a side payment, beyond or in place of what the donor would
receive through the organ allocation system). Once it is no longer objectionable to pay organ donors,
an arrangement in which a willing seller and a willing buyer agree to pay above a set price is the very
model of a “victimless crime.” When something is defined as not being a marketable commodity, then
it makes sense to prosecute those who violate the prohibition, as occurs if parents are paid for
transferring custody of their child. But if baby-selling took place in a “regulated market” (in which
parents could reap a financial reward for supplying an adopting couple with a much-wanted child), how
tolerable would it be to say that adopting couples must pay a fixed price into a state agency’s fund and
then take whichever child the agency chose to assign them, rather than being free to find an available
child and arrange payment directly with the child’s parents? Whether from the outset or once faced
with the side arrangements that will soon arise, policymakers, like prosecutors, who are willing to allow
payments for organs on the grounds advanced today by philosophers and economists that doing so
produces a win–win result (money for sellers and more organs for buyers) will soon be faced with the
inevitable conclusion from such liberty-based arguments, that, provided force and fraud are prevented,
the only defensible course is to allow those who wish to enter into such transactions to do so under the
conditions that meet their mutual needs.
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patients could exchange their funds for the kidneys of willing donors from Latin
120
America. But why should such an institution not have a more global reach
than that, when it is already apparent that thousands of Pakistanis, Indians,
Filipinos, and other impoverished “would be vendors” of the world, when
121
allowed “to decide for themselves about their own best interests,” are willing
to exchange a kidney for a relatively modest sum of money?
The argument for allowing payments for organs rests on the principle of
utility (that the greatest good consists in saving or, in the case of kidney
transplants, extending and improving, human life) and the principle of liberty
(that freedom of contract must be protected). Yet these principles provide no
grounds for erecting impediments to patients, physicians, or indeed health
systems seeking potential organ sellers anywhere in the world. As philosopher
Janet Radcliffe Richards argues, “If it is presumptively bad to prevent sales
altogether, because lives will be lost and adults deprived of an option some
would choose if they could, it is for the same reason presumptively bad to
122
restrict the selling of organs.” Thus, if restrictions are to be placed on markets,
principles other than utility and liberty must justify them. Such justification can
be found in the three basic principles of medical ethics: justice, beneficence, and
123
autonomy.
B. Ethical Challenges to a Market in Organs
Here the stories recounted earlier again become relevant. They are relevant
not for the reason they were initially recited—to show that the countries
whence potential transplant tourists came or whither they went to buy organs
are moving, however tentatively, toward enforcing international norms
regarding organs sales and transplant tourism. Rather, they are relevant
because they demonstrate the costs for buyers as well as sellers generated by
organ markets. Part of the cost is the injustice of a system in which the sellers
124
are the poorest in society, whose attempts to escape debt and poverty by
120. Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health & Env’t, supra note 13.
121. Richards, Commentary, supra note 24, at 140.
122. Id. Additionally, Richards continues her critique of the controlled system of organ sales
proposed in Erin & Harris, supra note 24, under which each organ market would be kept within a “self
governing geopolitical area,” by arguing,
Of course there is something undesirable about a one way international traffic from poor to
rich; but that is not enough to settle the all-things-considered question of whether it should be
allowed. Much international trade is currently objectionable on the same grounds, but simply
stopping it would be worse for the poor countries. It is much better, for them, to improve the
conditions of trade than to prevent it altogether. Is the case different with organs?
Richards, Commentary, supra note 24, at 140.
123. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, DHEW PUB. NO. (OS) 78-0012, THE
BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 4–9 (1978) (placing “autonomy” within the principle of “respect for
persons”).
124. Reports collected by Combatting Trafficking in Persons for the Purpose of Organ Removal
(known as the HOTT Project) from Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, India, Moldova, Pakistan, and the
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selling a kidney almost universally leave them worse off than they were before.
As Dr. Francis Delmonico, President of the Transplantation Society, has
remarked, “[T]he experience in Iran and elsewhere is that the poor remain poor
125
following a vendor sale and then with one less kidney.” Given the difficulties
126
that many organ vendors face with continuing to do manual labor, especially
127
when experiencing medical complications, it is not surprising that among the
100 Iranian donors interviewed in one study, virtually none would donate if
they had known then what they knew when interviewed (six months to eleven
128
years after donating). Indeed, 39% said they would prefer to beg and 60%
would prefer to get a loan instead of selling a kidney. More than three-quarters
129
of the interviewees thought kidney sales should be banned.
The injustice in taking kidneys from the global poor is certainly made worse
when, as is frequently true, they are not paid even the small amount they were
130
promised for their kidney. But the indisputable decline in the economic
Philippines recount that most unrelated kidney donors come from the ranks of the unemployed,
marginalized, and semi- or completely illiterate. HOTT PROJECT, TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS
FOR
THE
PURPOSE
OF
ORGAN
REMOVAL
35
(2013),
available
at
http://hottproject.com/userfiles/HOTTProjectTraffickinginHumanBeingsforthePurposeofOrganRemoval-AComprehensiveLiteratureReviewOnlinePublication.pdf. Even in Iran, one unpublished study of 300 living kidney donors conducted by
the Transplantation and Special Disease Centre found that 79% of donors were uninsured, only 30%
were employed full time, and just 6% were either at university or had a degree. Griffin, supra note 104,
at 504. The claim that brokers do not operate in Iran has been disputed. “One of our Organs Watch
researchers has reported directly from Iran that kidney sellers there are recruited from the slums by
wealthy kidney activists.” Scheper-Hughes, Keeping an Eye, supra note 19, at 1646.
125. Griffin, supra note 104, at 505.
126. See, e.g., DAVID J. ROTHMAN AND SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, TRUST IS NOT ENOUGH:
BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS TO MEDICINE 23 (2006) (noting that Filipino kidney sellers from the slums
of Manila “had typically worked at loading ships on the docks” but “were no longer physically able to
do the heavy lifting required” or “had been summarily fired because their bosses thought they were no
longer able”).
127. See Scheper-Hughes, Keeping an Eye, supra note 19, at 1647 (“On returning to their villages or
urban shantytowns, kidney sellers are often unemployed because they are unable to sustain the
demands of heavy agricultural or construction work, the only labour available to men of their skills and
backgrounds.”)
128. Javaad Zargooshi, Iranian Kidney Donors: Motivations and Relations with Recipients, 165 J.
UROLOGY 386, 387 (2001).
129. Id. A more recent study found that 91% of Iranian donors were satisfied with their donation,
and 53% suggested donation to others. Malakoutian T et al., Socioeconomic Status of Iranian Living
Unrelated Kidney Donors: A Multicenter Study, 39 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 824, 825 (2007).
Likewise, another study of 600 Iranian donors, found that only 1.5% regretted their decision at the time
of discharge. Heidary Rouchi A. et al., Compensated Living Kidney Donation in Iran: Donor’s Attitude
and Short-term Follow-up, 3 IRANIAN J. KIDNEY DISEASES, 34, 36 (2009). As Julian Koplin has pointed
out, however, both studies utilize surveys completed before discharge from the hospital whereas
Zargooshi’s respondents were interviewed at least six months postoperatively. Julian Koplin, Assessing
the Likely Harms to Kidney Vendors in Regulated Organ Markets, 14 AM. J. BIOETHICS, 7, 12 (2014).
The passage of time seems to be associated with growing regret, not only among Iranian organ vendors
but also in other countries, such as India and Bangladesh. Lawrence Cohen, Where It Hurts: Indian
Material for an Ethics of Organ Transplantation, DAEDALUS, Fall 1999, at 135, 141; Monir
Moniruzzaman, “Living Cadavers” in Bangladesh: Bioviolence in the Human Organ Bazaar, 26 MED.
ANTHROPOL. Q. 69, 80–81 (2012).
130. See JAMES S. TAYLOR, STAKES AND KIDNEYS: WHY MARKETS IN HUMAN BODY PARTS ARE
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security of organ vendors in a wide range of countries following the removal of
a kidney underlines that even being paid the full promised amount does little to
131
improve vendors’ long-term fiscal, much less physical, well-being. “For
vendors, the physical effects of nephrectomy, psychological effects of
depression, and social effects of stigma all undermine the ability to find and
132
maintain employment, reversing any short-term financial gains.”
An additional justice issue raised by organ markets is that they implicate the
medical system in the gross social inequity that occurs when those most in need
of health care or education are encouraged to jeopardize their future wellbeing. The tradition that once ennobled the medical profession of physicians
caring for those who are unable to pay has been eroded in recent years by the
increasing application of market principles to health care; it can hardly be
improved by making physicians agents in the extension of market principles to
the human body and its parts. No ethical physician would remove an eye or a
hand to make a beggar an object of greater pity and generosity, but only a fine
line separates such acts from the removal of a kidney from a poor organ vendor.
That the latter act is regarded as a mutilation by organ vendors can be seen
not only in those vendors’ critical views of physicians, but in the vendors’
133
common desires to hide scars and lie about their origins. This adversely affects
the donors’ health given that they are then reluctant to seek follow-up medical
care, not only because doing so risks shame and ostracism, but also because it
reminds them of the miserable personal situation that led them to sell their
kidney in the first place and of the ongoing position of peril in which that act
134
has placed them.

MORALLY IMPERATIVE 88–89 (2005); James Stacey Taylor, Autonomy, Inducements and Organ Sales,
in PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON MEDICAL ETHICS 135, 151 (Nafsika Athanassoulis ed., 2010);
James S. Taylor, Why the “Black Market” Arguments Against Legalizing Organ Sales Fail, 12 RES
PUBLICA 163, 163–78 (2006).
131. Roger Lee Mendoza, Colombia’s Organ Trade: Evidence from Bogotá and Medellin, 18 J. PUB.
HEALTH 375, 380 (2010); Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Illegal Organ Trade: Global Justice and the Traffic in
Human Organs, in LIVING DONOR ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 106, 118 (R.W.G. Gruessner & E.
Benedetti eds., 2007) (addressing vendors’ postdonative health in Brazil, Moldova, and the
Philippines); Sallie Yea, Trafficking in Part(s): The Commercial Kidney Market in a Manila Slum, 10
GLOBAL SOC. POL’Y 358, 369–70 (2010); Moniruzzaman, supra note 129, at 81 (addressing vendors’
postdonative health in Bangladesh).
132. Koplin, supra note 129 (manuscript at 13).
133. See, e.g., Scheper-Hughes, Keeping an Eye, supra note 19, at 1646 (quoting a twenty-sevenyear old Moldovan who reported that one individual had said of the surgeon who performed his
nephrology in Turkey, “How could that man call himself a doctor? That dog left me an invalid”).
Organs Watch found such “disappointment, anger, resentment and hatred for surgeons and even for
the recipients of their organs” to be so prevalent that Scheper-Hughes concludes that “kidney selling is
a serious social pathology.” Id.
134. See id. at 1647 (“Some were ashamed to appear in a public clinic because they had tried to
keep the sale (and their ruined bodies) a secret. Others were fearful of receiving a bad report because
they would be unable to pay for the treatments or medications. Above all, the kidney sellers I
interviewed avoided getting medical attention for fear of being seen and labeled as weak or disabled by
their potential employers, their families, and their co-workers, or (for single men) by potential girl
friends.”).
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135

As Richards argues, it would be difficult not to regard a market in organs
as a global business, with middlemen free to move organ vendors and recipients
anywhere in the world that would maximize utility (the most people
transplanted successfully at the least cost). This would represent a novel use of
the various “modes of supply” in cross-border trade of medical and other
136
services under the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Territorial limits
could be imposed on this market, as some proponents of a regulated market
137
favor, by invoking the principle of justice, but that raises the problem that the
same principle would call into question the entire enterprise. Does a situation in
which vendors from one group within a nation—the most economically and
socially marginalized citizens of that nation—provide kidneys for another,
largely separate group in that nation—patients who are well-off enough, wellenough cared for, and simply well enough to be candidates for an organ
transplant—seem much more just than when the vendors come from
impoverished settings on the other side of the world? The global impoverished
might usually be invisible to most people in the United States, emerging into
consciousness only when a factory in Dhaka, where people earn a pittance
making clothes for U.S. companies, catches fire, collapses, and kills the
138
employees therein. In the context of transplantation, it would only be when
members of this group arrived on our doorstep to sell their organs that they
would become at all real to us. Yet how different is that from many people’s
awareness of the homeless, the mentally ill, or the chronically unemployed from
the rural backwaters and inner cities of their own country? Were payments to
organ donors permitted, those would be the quarters to which organ brokers
would repair, to seek people willing to give up one of their kidneys for a price.
Although Westerners often feel they are able to take only small steps to
139
improve the lot of the poor far away in “the global South” (perhaps by buying
products made in factories that have been certified as adhering to better labor
and safety standards), if they were to rely an organ-procurement system built on
the backs of the poor in their own country they would be exacerbating the same
135. Richards, Commentary, supra note 24, at 140 (“[I]f it is presumptively bad to prevent sales
altogether, because lives will be lost and adults deprived of an option some would choose if they could,
it is for the same reason presumptively bad to restrict the selling of organs”.).
136. See Nancy J. King & Kishani Kalupahana, Choosing Between Liberalization and Regulatory
Autonomy Under GATS: Implications of U.S.-Gambling for Trade in Cross Border E-Services, 40
VAND. J. TRANSAT’L L. 1189, 1208–09 (2007).
137. See, e.g., Erin & Harris, supra note 24, at 137; Working Group on Incentives for Living
Donation, supra note 78, at 309 (stating that “there should be a fixed ‘incentive’ to the donor so that all
donors (in any one country) receive equal value” and that “the program (donors and recipients) should
be limited to citizens and legal residents”).
138. Anbarasan Ethirajan, Dhaka Bangladesh Clothes Factory Fire Kills More Than 100, BBC
NEWS (Nov. 25, 2012, 10:54 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-20482273.
139. Global
South,
AM.
UNIV.
CTR.
FOR
GLOBAL
SOUTH,
http://www1.american.edu/academic.depts/acainst/cgs/about.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2014).
Commentators have directly linked kidney sales to the exploitation of people from the global south.
Vinay Lal, Foreword to NANCY SCHEPER-HUGHES, THE LAST COMMODITY: POST-HUMAN ETHICS,
GLOBAL (IN)JUSTICE, AND THE TRAFFIC IN ORGANS 3, 11–12 (Vinay Lal ed., 2008).
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sort of inequities closer to home. Such inequities cannot be dismissed as matters
that ought to weigh solely on the consciences of surgeons and organ recipients,
because these inequities—which worldwide experience has made clear are the
dominant factor in determining who ends up as a paid organ donor—result
from the way our society treats its own most needy and vulnerable citizens.
In addition to the challenges that organ sales would pose to the principle of
justice, an organ market would also challenge the principle of beneficence. The
harm done to—and resented by—organ vendors signals that nonmaleficence,
140
the negative version of beneficence, is at risk of being violated. As noted
earlier, a potential violation of surgeons’ duty of nonmaleficence is inherent in
procuring organs from living donors, but, at least with unpaid related and other
altruistic donors, it is counterbalanced by the reasonable view that a surgeon is
acting to enable a donor to accomplish an act of great beneficence for the
recipient. Moreover, the ties between related donor–recipient pairs increases
the likelihood that the recipient will be concerned for the welfare of the donor
after the donation, as will the medical team. Such a sense of obligation can,
however, be diminished or extinguished when the gift relationship has been
replaced by an exchange of money: What thought does the average person give
141
to the welfare of a person from whom he or she has purchased something?
Organ vending also ill serves the principle of beneficence as applied to
recipients. Many of the factors that are relevant to accepting or rejecting a
potential organ donor depend on medical and social history, rather than solely
on the results of laboratory tests. A donor who is concerned with the welfare of
a potential recipient (with whom the donor would have, for example, a
biological or emotional connection) has every reason to cooperate fully with the
transplant team by providing complete and truthful information. In contrast, a
person faced with an opportunity to receive something of value for providing a
kidney to a stranger might choose to withhold material information that could
lead the transplant program to exclude that person as a donor. This factor may
contribute to the higher rate of complications and bad outcomes experienced by
142
patients who go abroad now to receive a transplant of a vended kidney,
though physicians’ desire to facilitate such transplants probably also contributes
to inadequate screening.
The third ethical principle, respect for autonomous decision-making, comes
into the discussion regarding organ markets in two ways. The first applies the
arguments developed over the past forty years in the legal and philosophical
140. Rather than follow THE BELMONT REPORT, supra note 123, in subsuming physicians’
traditional duty to “do no harm” within their duty to advance the interests and well-being of patients
and research subjects, most bioethicists follow the lead of Professors Tom Beauchamp and James
Childress, in regarding nonmaleficence as a duty distinct from beneficence. See generally TOM L.
BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS, SEVENTH EDITION
(2012).
141. See, e.g., U. Gneezy & A. Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13–14 (2000).
142. Jacob A. Akoh, Key Issues in Transplant Tourism, 2 WORLD J. TRANSPLANTATION 9, 12
(2012).
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realms based on assertions by, and on behalf of, patients who want to have the
final say about the medical interventions used in their care, especially care at
the end of life. According to the proponents of these arguments, respect for
individual autonomy reflects people’s sovereignty over their own bodies, based
on “their capacity to make choices about how their body is to be treated by
143
others.” This concept is, however, ill-suited to be transferred from the purely
self-regarding and self-protecting realm of medical care—where in legal terms it
is manifested in the rule that unwanted touching, even by a physician, amounts
144
to a trespass on the person —to the context of a transaction in which part of a
person’s body is traded for cash or something else of value. The claim asserted
in the latter case is not one of a sovereign, but of a merchant, and treating the
human body as merchandise does nothing to enhance either the dignity or the
bodily integrity of the person, concepts that are essential in explaining why it is
important to protect medical choices in the first place.
The second way that the opponents of the present regime invoke the
autonomy principle directly embraces the notion of organs as property for sale
and rests on the precepts of classical liberal economics in which free markets
expand people’s choices. Here, autonomy is manifested as the liberty to seek
whatever ends one wants and can achieve through buying and selling whatever
one has. Just as the first version of autonomy regards restrictions on organ sales
as paternalistic interference with an individual’s sovereignty over his or her
body, for the second version, these restrictions stand in the way of the welfare
maximization that an unfettered market would produce. Even accepting these
characterizations for the sake of argument, there are many circumstances in
which choices are constrained because of their effects, either directly on
particular others (the familiar harm principle of sic utero tuo, use your own
property so as not to harm another’s) or more generally on society. Other
principles—such as those of beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice, discussed
previously—are not subordinate to the principle of autonomy, so the
development of an ethical policy for organ donation must weigh their claims as
well. As Debra Satz has argued, we cannot ignore the adverse effects markets
may have on social equality nor the ways in which the unequal positions of
participants in markets both negate the voluntariness of certain choices and
145
produce unjust results. When some market participants act out of extreme
vulnerability or “weak agency” (because they either lack important information
about the nature of the market or are not direct participants in it), the market
not only inherits this characteristic of desperation and inequality, but
143. Gerald Dworkin, Markets and Morals: The Case for Organ Sales, in MORALITY, HARM, AND
155, 156 (Gerald Dworkin ed., 1994).
144. Schloendorff v. Soc’y N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (“In the case at hand, the wrong
complained of is not merely negligence. It is trespass. Every human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an
operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.”)
145. See generally DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE LIMITS OF
MARKETS (2010).
THE LAW
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146

exacerbates it.
The preceding considerations concern reasons why one might, in the name
of other ethical values, place limits or prohibitions on certain transactions in
which some people choose to engage. But when it comes to markets in organs,
there are good reasons to think that many of the sellers are not acting
voluntarily. “When people are choosing between selling their children and their
kidneys to meet essential family needs or to temporarily escape crushing debt,
147
coercion and exploitation—not autonomy—are the more apposite terms.” It is
easy to argue that there is no such thing as undue inducement. Many people
would prefer to live on perpetual holiday but are “induced” to show up at work
by the offer of the wages they need to support their lives. One can even suggest
that such archetypes as the “offer you can’t refuse” do not negate the notion of
voluntary choice. After all, individuals usually expect to part with their money
only when they obtain a good or service that they want, but they are willing to
hand over their wallets when faced with the choice of “your money or your life”
posed by an armed robber. Yet does such a highly determined or constrained
“choice” represent a level of voluntariness appropriate for the medical
148
procedure of obtaining a kidney from a living donor? There are good reasons
why transplant programs employ very high standards—implemented through
painstaking psychosocial evaluation of potential donors’ decision-making
capacity and motivation—in cases of unpaid living, related donation. To set
those standards aside when dealing with paid donors would afford the latter less
respect and concern for their dignity and worth as human beings.
Voluntariness can be undermined not only by individual psychological
forces but also by social circumstances because the existence of a market has
both endogenous effects (on the item being sold) and exogenous effects (on
persons beyond those who have chosen to participate in the market). Just as a
market in votes would change the meaning of elections, so too would a market
in organs change all kidneys for transplantation into medical commodities, like
artificial hips. Moreover, the existence of the market affects all persons whose
circumstances make them possible organ vendors.
For example, in the Tamil countryside where the practice of selling kidneys is widespread, the
organs are viewed as loan collateral. In such circumstances, a person who does not want to sell
her kidney may find it harder to obtain a loan. Many markets generate what economists call
pecuniary externalities—effects of production or exchange on outside parties through prices.
But although many markets have such effects, the question here is, Should a person face
149
restricted market opportunities for not wanting to sell her kidney?

146. See Debra Satz, The Moral Limits of Markets: The Case of Human Kidneys, 108 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 269, 282 (2008).
147. Nikola Biller-Andorno & Alexander Morgan Capron, “Gratuities” for Donated Organs:
Ethically Indefensible, 377 LANCET 1390, 1390 (2011).
148. The same sorts of concerns arguably apply to obtaining permission from grieving relatives to
procure the organ of a deceased donor, though the concern there is not protecting a person from
undergoing surgery based on less than fully informed or voluntary consent but protecting the family
from feeling exploited or taken advantage of, where the harm would be psychic rather than physical.
149. Debra Satz, Brother, Can You Spare a Kidney: The Real Cost of Selling Body Parts,
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In sum, all of these factors—the potential harms to organ donors and
recipients, the concomitant exploitation and exacerbation of inequities within
and between nations, the doubtful voluntariness of the decision to sell a kidney,
and the negative effects on the social environment when kidneys become
commodities with market value, making unpaid donation seem foolish and
pressuring the poor to monetize their kidneys—suggest that a belief in the
utility-maximizing effects of free markets and an attachment to autonomy as
protection against invasions of bodily integrity and paternalistic interference in
self-determination do not provide an adequate foundation for an ethically
defensible policy on organ donation.
C. Is a Market Likely to Generate Net Benefit?
In resolving the policy implications of the conflict among ethical values,
proponents of organ sales argue that the burden of persuasion falls on those
who urge prohibitions or restrictions because markets would make more organs
150
available and hence save more lives. The first response to such a claim is that
a society that fails to develop and utilize all forms of medical interventions to
extend every life does not fail its citizens, whereas one that builds life-saving
efforts on practices that are destructive of other important values—of equality,
151
dignity, and liberty—does. The second response—which does not depend
upon taking a stance on what constitutes a good society—is that good reasons
exist to doubt proponents’ claims that a market run according to acceptable
ethical standards would, in the long run, produce a larger number of organs
than can be achieved without financial inducements, much less put an end to
152
the shortage in organs.
Free-market economists are quick to pronounce that the organ
transplantation policies based on the noncommercial model followed by most
153
countries over the past three decades “have failed.” This seems a rather

STANFORD MAG. (Jan.–Feb. 2011), http://alumni.stanford.edu/get/page/magazine/article/?article_id=
28079.
150. See JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS, THE ETHICS OF TRANSPLANTS: WHY CARELESS
THOUGHT COSTS LIVES 45–48, 94–100 (2012).
151. See, e.g., Hans Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects, 98
DAEDALUS 219, 245 (1969) (“A slower progress in the conquest of disease would not threaten society,
grievous as it is to those who have to deplore that their particular disease be not yet conquered, but that
society would indeed be threatened by the erosion of those moral values whose loss, possibly caused by
too ruthless a pursuit of scientific progress, would make its most dazzling triumphs not worth having.”).
152. The notion that the “gap” between supply and demand can ever be closed ignores the elasticity
of demand. The large increase in the United States over the past twenty years in the number of people
waiting for a kidney transplant reflects not only the growing incidence of kidney disease (as to which
preventive efforts would be the preferable response) but also the substantial increase in the number of
kidneys available for transplantation, which makes nephrologists more willing to place patients on the
waiting list. Were kidneys no longer scarce, physicians would list not only those patients with less
severe kidney failure but also those patients whose prospects for a good outcome are lower because of
comorbidities.
153. T. RANDOLPH BEARD, DAVID L. KASERMAN & RIGMAR OSTERKAMP, THE GLOBAL
ORGAN SHORTAGE: ECONOMIC CAUSES, HUMAN CONSEQUENCES, POLICY RESPONSES 1 (2013).
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blinkered assessment of a system that has extended and improved millions of
lives while also providing a dramatic affirmation of human generosity and
solidarity. There is no question that more organs are needed, but were all
countries to adopt the “best practices” used by the organ-procurement
programs with the highest rates of donation, a huge increase in transplantation
would be possible without resort to paying for organs. Indeed, during the first
decade of this century, a concerted effort by the Department of Health and
Human Services led to an increase of more than twenty-five percent in the rate
154
of donation in the United States. Moreover, if only a small fraction of the
amount that would need to be spent to purchase organs in a “regulated market”
were instead used to improve the present system, further substantial increases
in the rate of donation would be possible.
But what of the claim that it is self-evident that paying for organs would
155
increase the net rate of donation? The extensive literature on “crowding out”
suggests that many people who are willing to donate in a voluntary, unpaid
156
system would cease doing so once paid donation became an accepted practice.
It is not simply that one does not want to be played for a fool (by giving away
what others are paid for), but that the nature of the act changes when it is not
experienced by the donor, and seen immediately and universally by others, as
something that is generous and ennobling. This change would be especially
pronounced if, as is likely to be the case, most organ vendors were understood
to be acting out of financial desperation.
Although today’s most highly motivated donors—those who are giving a
kidney to a close relative—might be expected to be immune to such a change,
this has been found not to be the case.
[R]ecently, when the U.S. rules for allocating deceased donor kidneys were changed to
give children on the waiting list greater access to deceased adult donors’ kidneys,
parental donations fell by a larger amount, so that overall fewer pediatric kidney
transplants are being done while some potential adult recipients have been deprived
of a kidney that went to a child instead.157

Likewise, the ready availability of vended kidneys and liver lobes would leave
most potential recipients disinclined to ask a relative or friend to donate. Who
154. Donors Recovered in the U.S. by Donor Type, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/step2.asp? (choose “Donor” for category; choose “All” for
organ; then follow “All Donors by Donor Type” hyperlink) (last updated Aug. 1, 2014).
155. See, e.g., Michael B. Gill & Robert M. Sade, Paying for Kidneys: The Case Against Prohibition,
12 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 17 (2002).
156. Gabriel M. Danovitch & Alan B. Leichtman, Kidney Vending: The “Trojan Horse” of Organ
Transplantation, 1 CLINICAL J. AM. SOC’Y NEPHROLOGY 1133, 1134 (2006) (“The term ‘crowding out’
describes the hypothesis that the moral commitment to do one’s duty can be weakened by financial
compensation and monetary reward.”). Richard Titmuss showed that the purchase of blood for
transfusions, which was allowed in the United States but forbidden in the United Kingdom,
“represse[d] the expression of altruism (and) erode[d] the sense of community” and led to “a generally
worsening situation” regarding blood collection in the United States. RICHARD TITMUSS, THE GIFT
RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 245 (Pantheon Books 1971).
157. Alexander M. Capron, Gabriel M. Danovitch & Francis L. Delmonico, Organ Markets:
Problems beyond Harm to Vendors, 14 AM. J. BIOETHICS 23, 24 (2014).
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would want to ask for such a gift from a loved one when his or her need for an
organ can be met without imposing any burden on that person and without
enmeshing oneself in all the psychological and moral complexities that arise in
158
“the gift relationship”? Summarizing observational and experimental research
over many decades by economists and social psychologists, Sheila and David
Rothman conclude that “although the case for the ‘hidden costs of rewards’ is
certainly not indisputable, it does suggest that a market in organs might reduce
159
altruistic donation and overall supply.”
Experience in countries around the world where recipients have paid for
kidneys lend further support to the results of research on crowding out. In the
countries where purchases have been the principal source of kidneys for
transplantation, kidneys have not been procured at rates near those of countries
that rely on unpaid donation, in part because the availability of organs
purchased from the poor reduces the pressure to create a system of
160
uncompensated deceased donation or of living-related donation. The clearest
evidence of this phenomenon is provided by Israel, which has overcome
religious and cultural barriers to deceased organ donation and has rapidly built
a successful program that relies on both deceased and living-related donors in
place of sending its patients to China, South Africa, Turkey, and the Philippines
161
to purchase organs. The Israeli success, as described by Jacob Lavee and
162
Avraham Stoler, has depended on much more than a change in the law: It has
relied on a concerted effort by the government and medical leaders to convey to
the public that organs for transplantation are a resource that will be available
163
for people in need only if the community makes them available.
158. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 129, at 161 (indicating that when payment for kidneys was still a
common practice in India, potential recipients preferred to purchase rather than ask relatives to be
donors); Moniruzzaman, supra note 129, at 83 (“many Bangladeshi recipients who can afford to do so
purchase organs from the poor, rather than seeking organ donation from their family members”).
159. S.M. Rothman & D.J. Rothman, The Hidden Cost of Organ Sales, 6 AM J. TRANSPLANTATION
1524, 1525 (2006).
160. A.H. Rizvi, A.S. Naqvi, N.M. Zafar & E. Ahmed, Regulated Compensation Donation in
Pakistan and Iran, 14 CURRENT OPINION IN ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 124, 127 (2009) (arguing that
paying for kidneys has forestalled development of deceased-donor programs, which are needed for
other solid organ transplant programs). The deceased donation that occurs in Iran, which is sometimes
cited to show that reliance on paid donors does not depress deceased donation, actually results from the
rejection of the national norm by one major center:
Shiraz Organ Transplant Centre is the largest centre [in] Iran performing liver and kidney
transplant from deceased donors. They started their programme with kidney transplantation
based on live altruistic donors without any monetary consideration in the name of
compensation. They maintained their policy for several years and finally their credibility took
them to becoming one of the largest centres of deceased liver transplantation in Middle East
and today they are performing the highest number of deceased transplants.
E-mail from Dr. Anwar Naqvi, Professor & Coordinator, Centre of Biomedical Ethics & Culture,
Sindh Inst. of Urology & Transplantation, to author (July 19, 2013, 5:17 AM) (on file with author).
161. Jacob Lavee et al., Preliminary Marked Increase in the National Organ Donation Rate in Israel
Following Implementation of a New Organ Transplantation Law, 13 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 780,
782 (2013).
162. See Lavee & Stoler, supra note 88.
163. Id.
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Some market proponents have argued that we should experiment with
NOTA’s prohibition on organ sales, perhaps by allowing individual states to try
164
out various forms of compensation or financial inducement —as though the
natural experiments with various forms of regulated and unregulated organ
markets that have occurred around the world over the past thirty years have not
already demonstrated that payments crowd out unpaid donations and prevent
development and optimal use of unpaid deceased donation. Social-policy
experiments undertaken by the government have indeed produced useful
results in a number of fields. These experiments have involved altering
165
government-supported benefit programs for some participants, so the ethical
issue they raise is whether some people may be treated differently than others
for a period of time. In contrast, to experiment with the ban on organ purchases
would require the dubious assumption that one can “experiment” with a policy
that rests on moral principles without in effect abandoning those principles.
Once established as a market commodity, how would kidneys go back to being
something that cannot be bought and sold? As Gneezy and Rustichini found in
their famous nursery study, not only did the imposition of a penalty when the
parents were late picking up their children change parents’ perception of what
the teachers provided from “a generous, nonmarket activity” to something that
could be bought, but even after the charge was eliminated, parents did not
166
revert to the old norm: “Once a commodity, always a commodity.”
V
WORDS WILL MEAN LITTLE IF OUR ACTIONS ARE OTHERWISE
The arguments just presented provide sound reasons not to abandon
NOTA’s prohibition on exchanging organs for “valuable consideration,” but if
more reasons are needed, the adverse effects of such a change on the newly
adopted prohibitions in a number of countries constitute additional strong
grounds for maintaining the present prohibitions in North America and Europe.
A brief review of developments in China—where recent progress in replacing
commercial organ procurement with a voluntary system that relies on
uncompensated deceased and living-related donors remains precarious and very
dependent on the combined efforts of many entities, from WHO to professional
and other nongovernmental organizations—illustrates this point.
The omission of China from the earlier catalogue of transplant hotspots that
have recently undergone reforms may have seemed puzzling given that both its
number of organ “donations” and its number of transplant tourists dwarf
167
activity in every other county. Moreover, the manner in which almost all of
164. Laura Meckler, Kidney Shortage Inspires a Radical Idea: Organ Sales, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13,
2007, at A1.
165. Michele Goodwin, The Veneer of Altruism, 14 VIRTUAL MENTOR 256, 258 (2012).
166. Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 141, at 14.
167. Mark McDonald, Beijing Investigates Transplants for Tourists, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009, at
A13.
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these organs have been obtained and distributed transgresses international
norms even more markedly than the often-criticized methods used in other
countries. Finally, the push and pull of the government’s attempts to bring its
practices into alignment with those norms is perhaps the most contested of any
national efforts at reform.
Details about China’s organ transplantation are controverted, but for nearly
thirty years it has had the most unusual program for obtaining organs of any
nation. For a country that is very large and diverse in territory and population
168
and that moved rapidly up the HDI during this period, the rate of organ
transplantation in China is not high: The combined living and deceaseddonation rate for all organs probably remains under twenty per million
169
population. But in absolute numbers (better than 10,000 transplants per year,
170
with a very high percentage going to foreign recipients ), the extent of China’s
program and its impact on the development of transplant programs in other
countries is potentially immense.
The basis for the Chinese transplant program has been the Temporary Rules
Concerning the Utilization of Corpses or Organs from the Corpses of Executed
171
Criminals, secretly issued by the government in 1984. Though criticized in the
172
past five years by Chinese officials themselves, the rules are still on the books
and account for the huge volume of deceased-donor transplantation in China
173
every year, which generates many millions of dollars in revenue. Under these
rules, organs from executed prisoners may be used for medical purposes if no
one claims the body, if the prisoner slated for execution volunteers to have his
174
corpse so used, or if the family consents after the execution. The use of
executed prisoners would raise concerns—most centrally, about validity of any
consent and about conflicts of interest—even were there no reason to have
doubts about the manner in which prisoners are condemned to death. But of

168. Human Development Index Trends, 1980–2012, U.N. DATA, http://data.un.org/
DocumentData.aspx?id=327 (last updated Mar. 27, 2013).
169. GLOBAL OBSERVATORY ON DONATION & TRANSPLANTATION, ORGAN DONATION AND
TRANSPLANTATION ACTIVITIES 2012, at 6, 7, 10 (2012), available at http://www.transplantobservatory.org/Documents/Data%20Reports/Basic%20slides%202012.pdf.
170. Radio broadcast: Falun Gong Prisoners Targeted For Organs, reported by Jennifer Macy,
Reporter, The World Today, Australian Broadcast News (Aug. 12, 2008), available at
http://mpegmedia.abc.net.au/news/audio/twt/200808/20080812twt08-chinas-organs.mp3.
171. Joan E. Hemphill, China’s Practice of Procuring Organs from Executed Prisoners: Human
Rights Groups Must Narrowly Tailor Their Criticism and Endorse the Chinese Constitution to End
Abuses, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 431, 446 (2007).
172. See Jiefu Huang, Yilei Mao & J Michael Millis, Government Policy and Organ Transplantation
in China, 372 LANCET 1937, 1937 (2008); China Admits Death Row Organ Use, BBC NEWS (Aug 26,
2009, 12:32 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8222732.stm (“In a rare admission of the extent to which
this takes place, China Daily—citing unnamed experts—said on Wednesday that more than 65% of
organ donations come from death row prisoners.”).
173. Christopher H. Smith, China’s Illegal Organ Harvesting, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2012),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/sep/18/chinas-illegal-organ-harvesting/.
174. David J. Rothman, The Body Shop: Harvesting Organs from Executed Prisoners in China,
SCIENCES, Nov. 1997, at 17, 19.
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course human-rights advocates have also raised grave doubts about the fairness
of the Chinese justice system.
First, it appears that the demise of organ donors may be timed for the
convenience of waiting recipients with whom each executed prisoner is well
matched, thus implying that executions are being carried out solely to benefit
175
organ recipients. Second, allegations have been made (and denied by the
government) that political, ethnic, and religious dissidents, such as ethnic
Uighurs in western China and the practitioners of the outlawed Falun Gong
discipline, constitute a disproportionate number of the persons targeted for
176
execution. The practice of taking organs from executed prisoners has been
repeatedly criticized by groups such as Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch but, even after Deputy Minister of Health Huang Jiefu publicly
acknowledged it in 2006 and stated that the time had come for Beijing to adopt
a sustainable basis for organ donation in line with international norms, the
177
practice continues, albeit it on a reduced scale. In March 2013, at the start of
the major People’s Congress to choose new leaders for the People’s Republic,
Dr. Huang announced that China would completely cease the practice of using
178
executed prisoners within two years. At a meeting in Hangzhou in October
2013, Bin Li, chairperson (equivalent to minister) of the National Health and
179
Family Planning Commission (NHFPC), announced a five-point plan that
committed the government and all hospitals to “open and transparent” organ
procurement and allocation and other standards to replace the use of executed
prisoners with living related donors and patients diagnosed dead on circulatory
180
or neurology grounds. This plan was then formally endorsed as the Hangzhou
175. See A.L. Caplan et al., Time for a Boycott of Chinese Science and Medicine Pertaining to Organ
Transplantation, 378 LANCET 1218, 1218 (2011); A. Sharif, et al.,Organ Procurement From Executed
Prisoners in China, 14 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2246, 2248 (2014).
[I]t also appears implausible that every prisoner deemed healthy enough to donate viable
organs is coincidentally scheduled for execution on the exact day a matching recipient is
available. This second paradox is of greatest concern, as it raises the question as to whether
the organ procurement follows the execution or if the death sentence follows the demand for
organs procured from a pool of prescreened prisoners.
Id.
176. See, e.g., DAVID MATAS & DAVID KILGOUR, BLOODY HARVEST: REVISED REPORT INTO
ALLEGATIONS OF ORGAN HARVESTING OF FALUN GONG PRACTITIONERS IN CHINA 12 (2007),
available at http://organharvestinvestigation.net/report0701/report20070131-eng.pdf; Ethan Gutmann,
The Xinjiang Procedure: Beijing’s ‘New Frontier’ is Ground Zero for the Organ Harvesting of Political
Prisoners, WEEKLY STANDARD, Dec. 5, 2011, at 19.
177. See Haibo Wang, New Era for Organ Donation and Transplantation in China, 90
BULL.WORLD HEALTH ORG. 802, 802 (2012) [hereinafter Wang, New Era].
178. Huang Qin, Chinese Regime’s Organ Transplant Spokesperson Fired: Restructuring Leaves
Deputy Minister Huang Jiefu Out of a job, Weeks after Suggesting Reform, EPOCH TIMES (Mar. 15,
2013), http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/3893-chinese-regimes-organ-transplant-spokesperson-fired/.
179. The NHFPC, one of the twenty-five ministries that make up the State Council, was created at
National People’s Congress in March 2013, by combining the Ministry of Health and the National
Population and Family Planning Commission. China to Merge Health Ministry, Family Planning
Commission, ENGLISH.NEWS.CN (Mar. 10, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/201303/10/c_132221724.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2014).
180. Jie-Fu Huang et al., China Organ Donation and Transplantation Update: The Hangzhou
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Resolution by the Chinese Transplant Congress, which met in that city on
November 1–2, 2013, at which time representatives of 38 of the nation’s leading
transplant hospitals signed the resolution and pledged to comply with the
interim regulations promulgated by the NHFPC in August 2013, in particular to
181
cease using executed prisoners as organ donors. However, the government has
not acted against transplant centers that continue to rely on organs from
182
executed prisoners, but has instead aimed to end transplants to non-Chinese
citizens (although the allowance for overseas Chinese citizens to return to
China for a transplant has apparently become a loophole for medical centers
183
that use Chinese names for their foreign patients).
Besides China’s singularity in terms of the scope of its commercial
transplant program and the source of the organs, the struggle among various
forces over the character of the new organ-transplant system that it is now
constructing has enormous implications not only for China but for the whole
world. On the one side are organ procurers who have linked the civilian and
military prisons with the hospitals where transplants have been performed; their
ability to resist change has been aided by the financial power they wield, the
regional distribution of influence and power within the bureaucracy, and the
difficulties facing the national health ministry in organizing an organprocurement system to replace the one that has relied on executed prisoners.
On the other side are Chinese transplant professionals, supported by the DICG
and international organizations such as WHO, who urge the government to
adopt reforms that will bring them into line with international ethical norms for
transplantation. These outside groups have offered guidance to the government
in crafting appropriate legislation to provide for the use of donors who die from
loss of neurological or circulatory functions while under medical care and to
condition licenses for hospitals’ transplant programs on following the new
184
rules.
Foreign transplant professionals have also been involved in programs to
train the staff of organ-procurement organizations on how to organize a fair and
Resolution, 13 HEPATOBILLIARY PANCREATIC DISEASES INT’L 122, 122 (2014).
181. Editorial Office, OTC Hangzhou Resolution, 2 HEPATOBILIARY SURGERY & NUTRITION 317
(2013) [hereinafter Editorial Office, Hangzhou Resolution]; Huang et al., supra note 180, at 123–24.
“More hospitals are anticipated [to sign the resolution] in the days ahead.” Huang et al., supra note 180,
at 124. “OTC” stands for the way the body now in charge of organ transplantation, the Organ
Transplantation Committee, is named in English. See Jiefu Huang et al., The National Program for
Deceased Organ Donation in China, 96 TRANSPLANTATION 5, 5 (2013) [hereinafter The National
Program].
182. Delmonico et al., Open Letter, supra note 50, at 795 (criticizing government’s failure to end
hospitals’ continued reliance on organs from executed prisoners, in violation of NHFPC regulations, as
well as corrupt practices that depart from prescribed rules for allocation of organs).
183. McDonald, supra note 167; Press Release, Doctors Against Forced Organ Harvesting, China’s
Announcement of Phasing Out the Harvesting of Organs From Prisoners is Deceptive and Insufficient
(Sept. 16, 2013), available at http://www.dafoh.org/dafoh-statement-chinas-announcement-of-phasingout-the-harvesting-of-organs-from-prisoners-is-deceptive-and-insufficient/.
184. Sam D. Shemie et al., International Guideline Development for the Determination of Death, 40
INTENSIVE CARE MED. 788, 789 (2014).
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transparent system and to work with physicians and potential donors
185
(individuals and the families of the deceased) in implementing the regulations.
The DICG has also sought to bring negative as well as positive reinforcement to
incentivize Chinese transplant professionals to adhere to international
standards by encouraging academic medical journals to place “barriers to the
publication of data that involve executed prisoners,” by advocating for
professional societies to prevent “the presentation at their meetings of clinical
research involving executed prisoners,” and by urging pharmaceutical
186
companies to limit “clinical trials in China for the same reason.”
Even the Chinese who employ international norms to push for change
within their own system do not want their country to be seen as bowing to
outside pressure. They point out that Western countries built their transplant
programs slowly and that a total transformation cannot reasonably be expected
to occur in a large nation that is simultaneously undergoing huge technical,
economic, and demographic changes, and they are reluctant to totally renounce
187
“the executed prisoner’s right to donate organs.” Such a concept may seem so
ludicrous as to be offensive, but how much freer is the choice exercised by
bonded laborers in Pakistan or slum dwellers in Delhi or Manila when they
accept a small sum to become kidney donors?
Dr. Huang Jiefu, who retired from the health ministry following the changes
in Communist Party leadership in the spring of 2013, was subsequently named
by the new minister, Bin Li, to head the newly created committee charged to
carry out the joint efforts of the NHFPC and the Red Cross Society of China
(RCSC) to promote organ donation and manage the allocation of organs from
188
deceased donors. The NHFPC has made clear its intention to have a fair and
transparent system for organ procurement and allocation, recognizing the
necessity of increasing deceased donation given the promised cessation of using
189
executed prisoners’ organs. In 2010, an experiment began in ten localities to
promote deceased donation; in five, the RCSC offered the families of potential
donors financial incentives, consisting of two parts. In Zhejiang Province, for
example, the deceased’s funeral expenses were paid and each consenting family
was provided $1600 for the purchase of a grave plot and $3200 in cash as an
expression of gratitude; further, the Red Cross gave families facing financial

185. Editorial Office, Hangzhou Resolution, supra note 181; Huang et al., supra note 180, at 122–
23.
186. Danovitch et al., Global Standards, supra note 35, at 1309; see also Caplan et al., supra note
175, at 1218.
187. See, e.g., Wang, New Era, supra note 177, at 802.
188. The new committee is known as the Organ Transplant Committee (OTC). See The National
Program, supra note 181, at 5.
189. Editorial Office, Hangzhou Resolution, supra note 181. The NHFPC regulations provide for
the mandatory use of a computer system for the allocation of organs to patients on the waiting list (the
China Organ Transplant Response System), the defined responsibility and geographical service area for
the organ-procurement organization, and the defined qualifications, responsibility and accreditation of
the organ donation coordinator.
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190

hardship extra compensation up to $4800. Such payments have been strongly
191
criticized, but have not been finally rejected by Dr. Huang and his colleagues.
They face a substantial dilemma because unlike countries where a relatively low
initial rate of deceased donation occurred at a time when the national capacity
to organize transplant surgeries was just beginning to be developed, China
already has a large transplantation infrastructure that has been supported by
the ready availability of organs from executed prisoners, so the prospect of
slowly building up deceased donation seems unacceptable to many important
192
actors in the field of transplantation. Although the RCSC experiment
indicates that, at least in the short-run, giving cash incentives to donor families
can increase number of organs available for transplantation, the experiment
also shows that no current Chinese deceased-donation program can produce the
volume of transplantable organs that would be necessary to fill the gap that
would arise were executed prisoners to truly cease being a source of organs.
Equally important, the RCSC experiment made clear that—as is true
whenever organs are exchanged for money—consent to donation comes
disproportionately from the poorest segments of society. Of the 207 deceased
193
donors obtained in the pilot program between March 2010 and March 2012,
90% of the donor families faced financial difficulties that entitled them to total
payments of up to $8000 (in a country where 10% of the population lives in
poverty, defined as an urban household that has annual living expenses below
$368 per capita). “This indicates that some of these families consented to
donation because they were in need of financial assistance,” on account of
general family poverty, the loss of the family’s principal source of income, or
194
high medical expenses.
The risk for China of adopting a policy of paying families that give
permission for organs to be removed from their deceased relative is particularly
grave because the notion of deceased donation is still unfamiliar to many
Chinese. Confusion and anxiety about determining death on neurological
grounds typically occurs among the public, and indeed among nurses and
physicians as well, in the early years of organ procurement from deceased

190. Xiaoliang Wu & Qiang Fang, Financial Compensation for Deceased Organ Donation in China,
39 J. MED. ETHICS 378, 378–79 (2013).
191. See, e.g., Francis L. Delmonico, A Welcomed New Policy in China, 96 TRANSPLANTATION 3, 3
(2013) [hereinafter Delmonico, A Welcomed New Policy in China] (payment undermines trust by
creating doubts among donor families about the reliability of death determinations and concerns by the
general public that the system will not fairly distribute organs and is corrupt; those who have paid for
the organs will of course sell them).
192. As diplomatically phrased by Dr. Huang and his coauthors, it is generally recognized “that the
development of a mature and ethical organ donation and transplantation system will be an arduous
journey with numerous difficulties and challenges.” Huang et al., supra note 180, at 124.
193. The enthusiasm for financially incentivizing donations has thus far produced such modest
results that the authors, in a model of understatement, describe the rate of donation in China as
“significantly lower than in Spain and other Western countries.” Wu & Fang, supra note 190, at 378.
194. Id. The authors note that “as the economy develops, the existing policy will become less
effective at incentivizing donation.” Id.
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195

donors. In China, a request to donate organs creates additional discomfort
because of the cultural norm that dead persons should go whole into the
196
afterlife. Some of the payment to donor families has been framed as an
expression of “thanks,” but at least half is justified as a means of relieving a
burden (for example, hospital and funeral bills) from the shoulders of especially
197
poor families. But it is hard to see the payments as an expression of fairness or
true generosity given that many families face crushing expenses and loss of their
main earner but only those that agree to donate organs are given funds. The
families that feel economically compelled to accept funds in exchange for their
198
consent are seen to have done something crass, which adds to their stress. The
result is that the system of commercialized organ procurement where organs
have a price continues to operate in China, the only difference being that while
payments formerly went to prison officials and middlemen, they now go to the
families of deceased donors and perhaps to the agents who pay them and then
199
have organs to allocate to hospitals for a price. Any short-term increase in the
rate of deceased donation creates a tremendous risk for the long-term success of
Chinese organ donation, which is now being framed as an activity that people
engage in only if they are in such dire financial need that they will abandon
their cultural traditions for a cash payment.
Because the Chinese transplant program is so large and the concept of
voluntary, unpaid donation of organs—especially by family members of
recently deceased patients—is still so unfamiliar, the choices being made by
government officials, the RCSC, and leaders of transplant programs in China
illustrate particularly dramatically the difficulties that come with any market in
organs. The adoption of such a market represents a value choice about human
relations, either viewing organ donations as acts of community solidarity and
personal goodness or treating organs as market commodities and regarding all
things as property suited to market transactions.
Any notion that paying families carries no harm is mistaken for at least
195. Laura A. Siminoff et al., Death and Organ Procurement: Public Beliefs and Attitudes, 59 SOC.
SCI. & MED. 2325, 2330–32 (2004).
196. Culturally Appropriate Geriatric Care: Delivery of Care, STANFORD SCH. MED.,
http://geriatrics.stanford.edu/ethnomed/chinese/delivery/advance_directives.html (last visited Aug. 9,
2014).
197. Wu & Fang, supra note 190, at 378–79.
198. Id. at 379 (stating that families in needy circymstances “have suffered great stress, as they were
thought to have sold organs of their deceased loved ones”).
199. Delmonico, A Welcomed New Policy in China, supra note 191, at 3; Yaqiu Wang, Amid
Scandals, Can China’s New Organ Transplant System Work?, TEA LEAF NATION (Sept. 19, 2013),
http://www.tealeafnation.com/2013/09/with-scandals-already-aplenty-can-the-new-organ-donationsystem-work-in-china/ [hereinafter Wang, Amid Scandals] (reporting that a poll of more than 1000
Guangzhou residents found that 79% regard deceased donation as “noble” but 81% worry that it will
lead to organ trade); Chinese Red Cross Accused of Demanding Donations for Organs, WANT CHINA
TIMES
(Oct.
7,
2013,
4:09
PM),
http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclasscnt.aspx?id=20130710000122&cid=1103 (municipal branches of RCSC, which control two-thirds of all
donated organs, have been accused of “asking hospitals to make donations if they want the use of these
organs”).
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three reasons. First, offering money tells people that organ donation is all about
financial gain, and that money ought to be the determinative factor in their
thinking—not honoring the deceased, saving lives, or supporting the
200
community. The result is to impoverish the relationship of these family donors
201
with the community and potentially to harm them psychologically. Second,
payment generates distrust in the system: If the family is being offered a
financial reward for providing an organ, might the physician caring for the
potential donor also be swayed by a comparable reward to compromise his
202
professional standards? And third, a system that provides financial rewards to
families that permit the removal of organs from their deceased relatives will
have to pay living donors as well, because it would seem inherently unfair to
reward families, who face no physical risk in agreeing to allow organ
procurement, but not to provide a financial reward to living donors, who
203
experience physical burdens and a small risk of substantial harm.
The situation in China epitomizes the peril—in practical and ethical terms—
faced by many countries transitioning toward an organ-transplant system
aligned with the WHO Guiding Principles and the Declaration of Istanbul but
pulled by powerful actors within their society—and even by one view of their
national interest—toward what many believe is the expedient solution to the
shortage of organ donors, namely providing financial rewards to donors. At the
same time, the Western countries that have built programs for uncompensated
donation which have successfully treated millions of patients with end-stage
organ failure over the past six decades also face an important choice: Should
they institute practical improvements in their programs to increase the rate of
donation or yield to the siren song of those who argue that when everything is
for sale everyone is better off?
The abandonment of the principle that the human body as such is not an
200. In 1994, while vacationing with their two children in Calabria, Reg and Maggie Green were the
victims of a shooting that left their seven-year-old son Nicholas “brain dead.” The generous nature of
their decision to donate his organs and corneas for transplantation received major coverage in the
Italian media and led to a quadrupling of donation rates in Italy. See NICHOLAS GREEN FOUND.,
http://www.nicholasgreen.org (last visited Aug. 24, 2013).
201. In a setting that offers genuine choice, few people would opt to sell rather than donate an
organ. See A. Rid et al., Would You Sell a Kidney in a Regulated Market? Results of an Exploratory
Study, 35 J. MED. ETHICS 558, 560–61 (2009). Studies of public attitudes reveal an overall preference
across different national and methodological settings for noncommercial forms of organ donation. See,
e.g., Klaus Hoeyer, Silke Schicktanz & Ida Deleuran, Public Attitudes to Financial Incentive Models for
Organs: A Literature Review Suggests That it is Time to Shift the Focus from ‘Financial Incentives’ to
‘Reciprocity,’ 26 TRANSPLANT INT’L 350, 355 (2013).
202. Wang, Amid Scandals, supra note 199 (noting that the distrust of potential organ donors
regarding the trustworthiness of the Red Cross Society of China discourages people from signing onto
the registry).
203. Several recent reports suggest that the long-term risks to donors (especially those in whom
kidney problems that would disqualify them as a donor have not yet emerged because they are still
young) are higher than were previously believed. See A.D. Muzzale, Risk of End-Stage Renal Disease
Following Live Kidney Donation, 311 J. AM. MED. ASSN. 579 (2014); G. Mjøen et al., Long-term Risks
for Kidney Donors, 86 KIDNEY INT. 126–67 (2014); R.W. Steiner et al., Estimating Risks of De Novo
Kidney Diseases After Living Kidney Donation, 14 AM. J. TRANSPLANT. 538 (2014).
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item of commerce would create a truly global market in organs that “is likely to
always flow in the one direction, further widening the gap between the rich and
204
the poor, the powerful and the powerless.” It would also provide the basis
needed by the brokers and surgeons working in developing countries who profit
from transplanting organs from poor “donors” to recipients from wealthy
nations to urge their governments to replace their nascent systems of
community-supportive, unpaid donations with some version of their old market
system, perhaps cosmetically enhanced to make it palatable to international
ethical and human-rights critics. This consequence is predictable and should not
be ignored when policymakers weigh the reasons for and against abandoning
sixty years of unpaid organ donation in the United States and other Western
nations.

204. Legal and Illegal Organ Donation, 369 LANCET 1901, 1901 (2007).

